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Abstract
Priced timed games are two-player zero-sum games played on priced timed automata (whose
locations and transitions are labeled by weights modeling the costs of spending time in a state
and executing an action, respectively). The goals of the players are to minimise and maximise
the cost to reach a target location, respectively. We consider priced timed games with one clock
and arbitrary (positive and negative) weights and show that, for an important subclass of theirs
(the so-called simple priced timed games), one can compute, in exponential time, the optimal
values that the players can achieve, with their associated optimal strategies. As side results, we
also show that one-clock priced timed games are determined and that we can use our result on
simple priced timed games to solve the more general class of so-called reset-acyclic priced timed
games (with arbitrary weights and one-clock).
1998 ACM Subject Classification D.2.4 Software/Program Verification, F.3.1 Specifying and
Verifying and Reasoning about Programs
Keywords and phrases Priced timed games; Real-time systems; Game theory
1 Introduction
The importance of models inspired from the field of game theory is nowadays well-established
in theoretical computer science. They allow to describe and analyse the possible interactions
of antagonistic agents (or players) as in the controller synthesis problem, for instance. This
problem asks, given a model of the environment of a system, and of the possible actions
of a controller, to compute a controller that constraints the environment to respect a given
specification. Clearly, one can not, in general, assume that the two players (the environment
and the controller) will collaborate, hence the need to find a controller strategy that enforces
the specification whatever the environment does. This question thus reduces to computing
a so-called winning strategy for the corresponding player in the game model.
In order to describe precisely the features of complex computer systems, several game
models have been considered in the literature. In this work, we focus on the model of Priced
Timed Games [16] (PTGs for short), which can be regarded as an extension (in several
directions) of classical finite automata. First, like timed automata [2], PTGs have clocks,
which are real-valued variables whose values evolve with time elapsing, and which can be
tested and reset along the transitions. Second, the locations are associated with price-rates
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Figure 1 A simple priced timed game (left) and the lower value function of location `1 (right).
and transitions are labeled by discrete prices, as in priced timed automata [4, 3, 6]. These
prices allow one to associate a cost with all runs (or plays), which depends on the sequence
of transitions traversed by the run, and on the time spent in each visited location. Finally,
a PTG is played by two players, called Min and Max, and each location of the game is owned
by either of them (we consider a turn-based version of the game). The player who controls
the current location decides how long to wait, and which transition to take.
In this setting, the goal of Min is to reach a given set of target locations, following a
play whose cost is as small as possible. Player Max has an antagonistic objective: he tries
to avoid the target locations, and, if not possible, to maximise the accumulated cost up to
the first visit of a target location. To reflect these objectives, we define the upper value Val
of the game as a mapping of the configurations of the PTG to the least cost that Min can
guarantee while reaching the target, whatever the choices of Max. Similarly, the lower value
Val returns the greatest cost that Max can ensure (letting the cost being +∞ in case the
target locations are not reached).
An example of PTG is given in Figure 1, where the locations of Min (respectively, Max)
are represented by circles (respectively, rectangles), and the integers next to the locations
are their price-rates, i.e., the cost of spending one time unit in the location. Moreover,
there is only one clock x in the game, which is never reset and all guards on transitions
are x ∈ [0, 1] (hence this guard is not displayed and transitions are only labeled by their
respective discrete cost): this is an example of simple priced timed game, as we will define
them properly later. It is easy to check thatMin can force reaching the target location `f from
all configurations (`, ν) of the game, where ` is a location and ν is a real valuation of the clock
in [0, 1]. Let us comment on the optimal strategies for both players. From a configuration
(`4, ν), with ν ∈ [0, 1], Max better waits until the clock takes value 1, before taking the
transition to `f (he is forced to move, by the rule of the game). Hence, Max’s optimal value
is 3(1− ν)− 7 = −3ν − 4 from all configurations (`4, ν). Symmetrically, it is easy to check
that Min better waits as long as possible in `7, hence his optimal value is −16(1−ν) from all
configurations (`7, ν). However, optimal value functions are not always that simple, see for
instance the lower value function of `1 on the right of Figure 1, which is a piecewise affine
function. To understand why value functions can be piecewise affine, consider the sub-game
enclosed in the dotted rectangle in Figure 1, and consider the value that Min can guarantee
from a configuration of the form (`3, ν) in this sub-game. Clearly, Min must decide how long
he will spend in `3 and whether he will go to `4 or `7. His optimal value from all (`3, ν) is thus
inf06t61−ν min
(
4t+(−3(ν+ t)−4), 4t+6−16(1− (ν+ t))) = min(−3ν−4, 16ν−10). Since
16ν−10 > −3ν−4 if and only if ν 6 6/19, the best choice of Min is to move instantaneously
to `7 if ν ∈ [0, 6/19] and to move instantaneously to `4 if ν ∈ (6/19, 1], hence the value
function of `3 (in the subgame) is a piecewise affine function with two pieces.
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Related work. PTGs were independently investigated in [8] and [1]. For (non-necessarily
turn-based) PTGs with non-negative prices, semi-algorithms are given to decide the value
problem that is to say, whether the lower value of a location (the best cost that Min can
guarantee in valuation 0), is below a given threshold. They also showed that, under the
strongly non-Zeno assumption on prices (asking the existence of κ > 0 such that every
cycle in the underlying region graph has a cost at least κ), the proposed semi-algorithms
always terminate. This assumption was justified in [11, 7] by showing that, in the absence
of non-Zeno assumption, the existence problem, that is to decide whether Min has a strategy
guaranteeing to reach a target location with a cost below a given threshold, is indeed un-
decidable for PTGs with non-negative prices and three or more clocks. This result was
recently extended in [9] to show that the value problem is also undecidable for PTGs with
non-negative prices and four or more clocks. In [5], the undecidability of the existence prob-
lem has also been shown for PTGs with arbitrary price-rates (without prices on transitions),
and two or more clocks. On a positive side, the value problem was shown decidable by [10]
for PTGs with one clock when the prices are non-negative: a 3-exponential time algorithm
was first proposed, further refined in [17, 15] into an exponential time algorithm. The key
point of those algorithms is to reduce the problem to the computation of optimal values in
a restricted family of PTGs called Simple Priced Timed Games (SPTGs for short), where
the underlying automata contain no guard, no reset, and the play is forced to stop after one
time unit. More precisely, the PTG is decomposed into a sequence of SPTGs whose value
functions are computed and re-assembled to yield the value function of the original PTG.
Alternatively, and with radically different techniques, a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm
to solve one-clock PTGs with arbitrary prices on transitions, and price-rates restricted to
two values amongst {−d, 0,+d} (with d ∈ N) was given in [13].
Contributions. Following the decidability results sketched above, we consider PTGs with
one clock. We extend those results by considering arbitrary (positive and negative) prices.
Indeed, all previous works on PTGs with only one clock (except [13]) have considered non-
negative weights only, and the status of the more general case with arbitrary weights has so
far remained elusive. Yet, arbitrary weights are an important modeling feature. Consider,
for instance, a system which can consume but also produce energy at different rates. In
this case, energy consumption could be modeled as a positive price-rate, and production by
a negative price-rate. We propose an exponential time algorithm to compute the value of
one-clock SPTGs with arbitrary weights. While this result might sound limited due to the
restricted class of simple PTGs we can handle, we recall that the previous works mentioned
above [10, 17, 15] have demonstrated that solving SPTGs is a key result towards solving more
general PTGs. Moreover, this algorithm is, as far as we know, the first to handle the full
class of SPTGs with arbitrary weights, and we note that the solutions (either the algorithms
or the proofs) known so far do not generalise to this case. Finally, as a side result, this
algorithm allows us to solve the more general class of reset-acyclic one-clock PTGs that we
introduce. Thus, although we can not (yet) solve the whole class of PTGs with arbitrary
weights, our result may be seen as a potentially important milestone towards this goal.
Some proofs and technical details are in the Appendix.
2 Priced timed games: syntax, semantics, and preliminary results
Notations and definitions. Let x denote a positive real-valued variable called clock. A
guard (or clock constraint) is an interval with endpoints in N∪{+∞}. We often abbreviate
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guards, for instance x 6 5 instead of [0, 5]. Let S ⊆ Guard(x) be a finite set of guards. We
let [[S]] =
⋃
I∈S I. Assuming M0 = 0 < M1 < · · · < Mk are all the endpoints of the intervals
in S (to which we add 0), we let RegS = {(Mi,Mi+1) | 0 6 i 6 k − 1} ∪ {{Mi} | 0 6 i 6 k}
be the set of regions of S. Observe that RegS is also a set of guards.
We rely on the notion of cost function to formalise the notion of optimal value function
sketched in the introduction. Formally, for a set of guards S ⊆ Guard(x), a cost function
over S is a function f : [[RegS ]]→ R = R ∪ {+∞,−∞} such that over all regions r ∈ RegS ,
f is either infinite or a continuous piecewise affine function, with a finite set of cutpoints
(points where the first derivative is not defined) {κ1, . . . , κp} ⊆ Q, and with f(κi) ∈ Q for
all 1 6 i 6 p. In particular, if f(r) = {f(ν) | ν ∈ r} contains +∞ (respectively, −∞) for
some region r, then f(r) = {+∞} (f(r) = {−∞}). We denote by CFS the set of all cost
functions over S. In our algorithm to solve SPTGs, we will need to combine cost functions
thanks to the B operator. Let f ∈ CFS and f ′ ∈ CFS′ be two costs functions on set of guards
S, S′ ⊆ Guard(x), such that [[S]] ∩ [[S′]] is a singleton. We let f B f ′ be the cost function
in CFS∪S′ such that (f B f ′)(ν) = f(ν) for all ν ∈ [[RegS ]], and (f B f ′)(ν) = f ′(ν) for all
ν ∈ [[RegS′ ]] \ [[RegS ]].
We consider an extended notion of one-clock priced timed games (PTGs for short) allow-
ing for the use of urgent locations, where only a zero delay can be spent, and final cost func-
tions which are associated with each final location and incur an extra cost to be paid when
ending the game in this location. Formally, a PTG G is a tuple (LMin, LMax, Lf , Lu,ϕ,∆, pi)
where LMin (respectively, LMax) is a finite set of locations for player Min (respectively, Max),
with LMin∩LMax = ∅; Lf is a finite set of final locations, and we let L = LMin∪LMax ∪Lf be
the whole location space; Lu ⊆ L\Lf indicates urgent locations1; ∆ ⊆ (L\Lf )×Guard(x)×
{>,⊥} × L is a finite set of transitions; ϕ = (ϕ`)`∈Lf associates to each ` ∈ Lf its final
cost function, that is an affine2 cost function ϕ` over SG = {I | ∃`, R, `′ : (`, I, R, `′) ∈ ∆};
pi : L ∪∆→ Z mapping an integer price to each location—its price-rate—and transition.
Intuitively, a transition (`, I, R, `′) changes the current location from ` to `′ if the clock
has value in I and the clock is reset according to the Boolean R. We assume that, in all PTGs,
the clock x is bounded, i.e., there is M ∈ N such that for all guards I ∈ SG , I ⊆ [0,M ].3
We denote by RegG the set RegSG of regions of G. We further denote4 by ΠtrG , ΠlocG and
ΠfinG respectively the values maxδ∈∆ |pi(δ)|, max`∈L |pi(`)| and supν∈[0,M ] max`∈L |ϕ`(ν)| =
max`∈L max(|ϕ`(0)|, |ϕ`(M)|). That is, ΠtrG , ΠlocG and ΠfinG are the largest absolute values of
the location prices, transition prices and final cost functions.
Let G = (LMin, LMax, Lf , Lu,ϕ,∆, pi) be a PTG. A configuration of G is a pair s = (`, ν) ∈
L ×R+. We denote by ConfG the set of configurations of G. Let (`, ν) and (`′, ν′) be two
configurations. Let δ = (`, I, R, `′) ∈ ∆ be a transition of G and t ∈ R+ be a delay. Then,
there is a (t, δ)-transition from (`, ν) to (`′, ν′) with cost c, denoted by (`, ν) t,δ,c−−−→ (`′, ν′),
if (i) ` ∈ Lu implies t = 0; (ii) ν + t ∈ I; (iii) R = > implies ν′ = 0; (iv) R = ⊥
implies ν′ = ν + t; (v) c = pi(δ) + t × pi(`). Observe that the cost of (t, δ) takes into
account the price-rate of `, the delay spent in `, and the price of δ. We assume that
1 Here we differ from [10] where Lu ⊆ LMax.
2 The affine restriction on final cost function is to simplify our further arguments, though we do believe
that all of our results could be adapted to cope with general cost functions.
3 Observe that this last restriction is not without loss of generality in the case of PTGs. While all timed
automata A can be turned into an equivalent (with respect to reachability properties) A′ whose clocks
are bounded [4], this technique can not be applied to PTGs, in particular with arbitrary prices.
4 Throughout the paper, we often drop the G in the subscript of several notations when the game is clear
from the context.
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the game has no deadlock: for all s ∈ ConfG , there are (t, δ, c) and s′ ∈ ConfG such that
s
t,δ,c−−−→ s′. Finally, we write s c−→ s′ whenever there are t and δ such that s t,δ,c−−−→ s′. A
play of G is a finite or infinite path ρ = (`0, ν0) c0−→ (`1, ν1) c1−→ (`2, ν2) · · · . For a finite play
ρ = (`0, ν0)
c0−→ (`1, ν1) c1−→ (`2, ν2) · · · cn−1−−−→ (`n, νn), we let |ρ| = n. For an infinite play
ρ = (`0, ν0)
c0−→ (`1, ν1) c1−→ (`2, ν2) · · · , we let |ρ| be the least position i such that `i ∈ Lf
if such a position exists, and |ρ| = +∞ otherwise. Then, we let CostG(ρ) be the cost of ρ,
with CostG(ρ) = +∞ if |ρ| = +∞, and CostG(ρ) =
∑|ρ|−1
i=0 ci + ϕ`|ρ|(ν|ρ|) otherwise.
A strategy for player Min is a function σMin mapping every finite play ending in loca-
tion of Min to a pair (t, δ) ∈ R+ × ∆, indicating what Min should play. We also request
that the strategy proposes only valid pairs (t, δ), i.e., that for all runs ρ ending in (`, ν),
σMin(ρ) = (t, (`, I, R, `′)) implies that ν + t ∈ I. Strategies σMax of player Max are defined
accordingly. We let StratMin(G) and StratMax(G) be the sets of strategies of Min and Max,
respectively. A pair of strategies (σMin, σMax) ∈ StratMin(G) × StratMax(G) is called a profile
of strategies. Together with an initial configuration s0 = (`0, ν0), it defines a unique play
Play(s0, σMin, σMax) = s0 c0−→ s1 c1−→ s2 · · · sk ck−→ · · · where for all j > 0, sj+1 is the unique
configuration such that sj
tj ,δj ,cj−−−−−→ sj+1 with (tj , δj) = σMin(s0 c0−→ s1 · · · sj−1 cj−1−−−→ sj) if
`j ∈ LMin; and (tj , δj) = σMax(s0 c0−→ s1 · · · sj−1 cj−1−−−→ sj) if `j ∈ LMax. We let Play(σMin)
(respectively, Play(s0, σMin)) be the set of plays that conform with σMin (and start in s0).
As sketched in the introduction, we consider optimal reachability-cost games on PTGs,
where the aim of playerMin is to reach a location of Lf while minimising the cost. To formal-
ise this objective, we let the value of a strategy σMin for Min be the function ValσMinG : ConfG →
R such that for all s ∈ ConfG : ValσMinG (s) = supσMax∈StratMax Cost(Play(s, σMin, σMax)). Intu-
itively, ValσMinG (s) is the largest value that Max can achieve when playing against strategy
σMin of Min (it is thus a worst case from the point of view of Min). Symmetrically, for
σMax ∈ StratMax, ValσMaxG (s) = infσMin∈StratMin Cost(Play(s, σMin, σMax)), for all s ∈ ConfG .
Then, the upper and lower values of G are respectively the functions ValG : ConfG → R
and ValG : ConfG → R where, for all s ∈ ConfG , ValG(s) = infσMin∈StratMin ValσMinG (s) and
ValG(s) = supσMax∈StratMax Val
σMax
G (s). We say that a game is determined if the lower and the
upper values match for every configuration s, and in this case, we say that the optimal value
ValG of the game G exists, defined by ValG = ValG = ValG . A strategy σMin of Min is optimal
(respectively, ε-optimal) if ValσMinG = ValG (Val
σMin
G 6 ValG + ε), i.e., σMin ensures that the
cost of the plays will be at most ValG (ValG + ε). Symmetrically, a strategy σMax of Max is
optimal (respectively, ε-optimal) if ValσMaxG = ValG (Val
σMax
G > ValG − ε).
Properties of the value. Let us now prove useful preliminary properties of the value func-
tion of PTGs, that—as far as we know—had hitherto never been established. Using a general
determinacy result by Gale and Stewart [14], we can show that PTGs (with one clock) are
determined. Hence, the value function ValG exists for all PTG G. We can further show that,
for all locations `, ValG(`) is a piecewise continuous function that might exhibit discontinu-
ities only on the borders of the regions of RegG (where ValG(`) is the function such that
ValG(`)(ν) = ValG(`, ν) for all ν ∈ R+). See Appendix A for detailed proofs of these results.
The continuity holds only in the case of PTGs with a single clock. An example with two
clocks and a value function exhibiting discontinuities inside a region is in Appendix B.
I Theorem 1. For all (one-clock) PTGs G: (i) ValG = ValG, i.e., PTGs are determined;
and (ii) for all r ∈ RegG, for all ` ∈ L, ValG(`) is either infinite or continuous over r.
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Simple priced timed games. As sketched in the introduction, our main contribution is to
solve the special case of simple one-clock priced timed games with arbitrary costs. Formally,
an r-SPTG, with r ∈ Q+ ∩ [0, 1], is a PTG G = (LMin, LMax, Lf , Lu,ϕ,∆, pi) such that for
all transitions (`, I, R, `′) ∈ ∆, I = [0, r] and R = ⊥. Hence, transitions of r-SPTGs are
henceforth denoted by (`, `′), dropping the guard and the reset. Then, an SPTG is a 1-SPTG.
This paper is devoted mainly to proving the following theorem on SPTGs:
I Theorem 2. Let G be an SPTG. Then, for all locations ` ∈ L, the function ValG(`) is either
infinite, or continuous and piecewise-affine with at most an exponential number of cutpoints.
The value functions for all locations, as well as a pair of optimal strategies (σMin, σMax) (that
always exist if no values are infinite) can be computed in exponential time.
Before sketching the proof of this theorem, we discuss a class of (simple) strategies that
are sufficient to play optimally. Roughly speaking, Max has always a memoryless optimal
strategy, while Min might need (finite) memory to play optimally—it is already the case in
untimed quantitative reachability games with arbitrary weights (see Appendix C). Moreover,
these strategies are finitely representable (recall that even a memoryless strategy depends
on the current configuration and that there are infinitely many in our time setting).
We formalise Max’s strategies with the notion of finite positional strategy (FP-strategy):
they are memoryless strategies σ (i.e., for all finite plays ρ1 = ρ′1
c1−→ s and ρ2 = ρ′2 c2−→ s
ending in the same configuration, we have σ(ρ1) = σ(ρ2)), such that for all locations `,
there exists a finite sequence of rationals 0 6 ν`1 < ν`2 < · · · < ν`k = 1 and a finite sequence
of transitions δ1, . . . , δk ∈ ∆ such that (i) for all 1 6 i 6 k, for all ν ∈ (ν`i−1, ν`i ], either
σ(`, ν) = (0, δi), or σ(q, ν) = (ν`i − ν, δi) (assuming ν`0 = min(0, ν`1)); and (ii) if ν`1 > 0,
then σ(`, 0) = (ν`1, δ1). We let pts(σ) be the set of ν`i for all ` and i, and int(σ) be the
set of all successive intervals generated by pts(σ). Finally, we let |σ| = |int(σ)| be the size
of σ. Intuitively, in an interval (ν`i−1, ν`i ], σ always returns the same move: either to take
immediately δi or to wait until the clock reaches the endpoint ν`i and then take δi.
Min, however may require memory to play optimally. Informally, we will compute optimal
switching strategies, as introduced in [12] (in the untimed setting). A switching strategy
is described by a pair (σ1Min, σ2Min) of FP-strategies and a switch threshold K, and consists
in playing σ1Min until the total accumulated cost of the discrete transitions is below K; and
then to switch to strategy σ2Min. The role of σ2Min is to ensure reaching a final location: it
is thus a (classical) attractor strategy. The role of σ1Min, on the other hand, is to allow
Min to decrease the cost low enough (possibly by forcing negative cycles) to secure a cost
below K, and the computation of σ1Min is thus the critical point in the computation of
an optimal switching strategy. To characterise σ1Min, we introduce the notion of negative
cycle strategy (NC-strategy). Formally, an NC-strategy σMin of Min is an FP-strategy such
that for all runs ρ = (`1, ν)
c1−→ · · · ck−1−−−→ (`k, ν′) ∈ Play(σMin) with `1 = `k, and ν, ν′ in
the same interval of int(σMin), the sum of prices of discrete transitions is at most −1, i.e.,
pi(`1, `2) + · · · + pi(`k−1, `k) 6 −1. To characterise the fact that σ1Min must allow Min to
reach a cost which is small enough, without necessarily reaching a target state, we define the
fake value of an NC-strategy σMin from a configuration s as fakeσMinG (s) = sup{Cost(ρ) | ρ ∈
Play(s, σMin), ρ reaches a target}, i.e., the value obtained when ignoring the σMin-induced
plays that do not reach the target. Thus, clearly, fakeσMinG (s) 6 Val
σMin(s). We say that an
NC-strategy is fake-optimal if its fake value, in every configuration, is equal to the optimal
value of the configuration in the game. This is justified by the following result whose proof
relies on the switching strategies described before (see a detailed proof in Appendix D):
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Algorithm 1: solveInstant(G,ν)
Input: r-SPTG G = (LMin, LMax, Lf , Lu,ϕ,∆, pi), a valuation ν ∈ [0, r]
1 foreach ` ∈ L do
2 if ` ∈ Lf then X(`) := ϕ`(ν) else X(`) := +∞
3 repeat
4 Xpre := X
5 foreach ` ∈ LMax do X(`) := max(`,`′)∈∆
(
pi(`, `′) + Xpre(`′)
)
6 foreach ` ∈ LMin do X(`) := min(`,`′)∈∆
(
pi(`, `′) + Xpre(`′)
)
7 foreach ` ∈ L such that X(`) < −(|L| − 1)Πtr −Πfin do X(`) := −∞
8 until X = Xpre
9 return X
I Lemma 3. If ValG(`, ν) 6= +∞, for all ` and ν, then for all NC-strategies σMin, there is a
strategy σ′Min such that Val
σ′Min
G (s) 6 fake
σMin
G (s) for all configurations s. In particular, if σMin
is a fake-optimal NC-strategy, then σ′Min is an optimal (switching) strategy of the SPTG.
Then, an SPTG is called finitely optimal if (i) Min has a fake-optimal NC-strategy;
(ii) Max has an optimal FP-strategy; and (iii) ValG(`) is a cost function, for all locations `.
The central point in establishing Theorem 2 will thus be to prove that all SPTGs are
finitely optimal, as this guarantees the existence of well-behaved optimal strategies and
value functions. We will also show that they can be computed in exponential time. The proof
is by induction on the number of urgent locations of the SPTG. In Section 3, we address the
base case of SPTGs with urgent locations only (where no time can elapse). Since these SPTGs
are very close to the untimed min-cost reachability games of [12], we adapt the algorithm
in this work and obtain the solveInstant function (Algorithm 1). This function can also
compute ValG(`, 1) for all ` and all games G (even with non-urgent locations) since time
can not elapse anymore when the clock has valuation 1. Next, using the continuity result
of Theorem 1, we can detect locations ` where ValG(`, ν) ∈ {+∞,−∞}, for all ν ∈ [0, 1],
and remove them from the game. Finally, in Section 4 we handle SPTGs with non-urgent
locations by refining the technique of [10, 17] (that work only on SPTGs with non-negative
costs). Compared to [10, 17], our algorithm is simpler, being iterative, instead of recursive.
3 SPTGs with only urgent locations
Throughout this section, we consider an r-SPTG G = (LMin, LMax, Lf , Lu,ϕ,∆, pi) where all
locations are urgent, i.e., Lu = LMin ∪ LMax. We first explain briefly how we can compute
the value function of the game for a fixed clock valuation ν ∈ [0, r] (more precisely, we can
compute the vector (ValG(`, ν))`∈L). Since no time can elapse, we can adapt the techniques
developed in [12] to solve (untimed) min-cost reachability games. The adaptation consists
in taking into account the final cost functions (see Appendix E). This yields the function
solveInstant (Algorithm 1), that computes the vector (ValG(`, ν))`∈L for a fixed ν. The
results of [12] also allow us to compute associated optimal strategies: when Val(`, ν) /∈
{−∞,+∞} the optimal strategy for Max is memoryless, and the optimal strategy for Min is
a switching strategy (σ1Min, σ2Min) with a threshold K (as described in the previous section).
Now let us explain how we can reduce the computation of ValG(`) : ν ∈ [0, r] 7→ Val(`, ν)
(for all `) to a finite number of calls to solveInstant. Let FG be the set of affine functions
over [0, r] such that FG = {k + ϕ` | ` ∈ Lf ∧ k ∈ I}, where I = [−(|L| − 1)Πtr, |L|Πtr] ∩ Z.
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Observe that FG has cardinality 2|L|2Πtr, i.e., pseudo-polynomial in the size of G. From
[12], we conclude that the functions in FG are sufficient to characterise ValG , in the following
sense: for all ` ∈ L and ν ∈ [0, r] such that Val(`, ν) /∈ {−∞,+∞}, there is f ∈ FG with
Val(`, ν) = f(ν) (see Lemma 16, Appendix E for the details). Using the continuity of ValG
(Theorem 1), we show that all the cutpoints of ValG are intersections of functions from FG ,
i.e., belong to the set of possible cutpoints PossCPG = {ν ∈ [0, r] | ∃f1, f2 ∈ FG f1 6=
f2 ∧ f1(ν) = f2(ν)}. Observe that PossCPG contains at most |FG |2 = 4|Lf |4(Πtr)2 points
(also a pseudo-polynomial in the size of G) since all functions in FG are affine, and can
thus intersect at most once with every other function. Moreover, PossCPG ⊆ Q, since all
functions of FG take rational values in 0 and r ∈ Q. Thus, for all `, ValG(`) is a cost function
(with cutpoints in PossCPG and pieces from FG). Since ValG(`) is a piecewise affine function,
we can characterise it completely by computing only its value on its cutpoints. Hence, we
can reconstruct ValG(`) by calling solveInstant on each rational valuation ν ∈ PossCPG .
From the optimal strategies computed along solveInstant [12], we can also reconstruct a
fake-optimal NC-strategy for Min and an optimal FP-strategy for Max, hence:
I Proposition 4. Every r-SPTG G with only urgent locations is finitely optimal. Moreover,
for all locations `, the piecewise affine function ValG(`) has cutpoints in PossCPG of cardin-
ality 4|Lf |4(Πtr)2, pseudo-polynomial in the size of G.
4 Solving general SPTGs
In this section, we consider SPTGs with possibly non-urgent locations. We first prove that
all such SPTGs are finitely optimal. Then, we introduce Algorithm 2 to compute optimal
values and strategies of SPTGs. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first algorithm
to solve SPTGs with arbitrary weights. Throughout the section, we fix an SPTG G =
(LMin, LMax, Lf , Lu,ϕ,∆, pi) with possibly non-urgent locations. Before presenting our core
contributions, let us explain how we can detect locations with infinite values. As already
argued, we can compute Val(`, 1) for all ` assuming all locations are urgent, since time can
not elapse anymore when the clock has valuation 1. This can be done with solveInstant.
Then, by continuity, Val(`, 1) = +∞ (respectively, Val(`, 1) = −∞), for some ` if and only if
Val(`, ν) = +∞ (respectively, Val(`, ν) = −∞) for all ν ∈ [0, 1]. We remove from the game
all locations with infinite value without changing the values of other locations (as justified
in [12]). Thus, we henceforth assume that Val(`, ν) ∈ R for all (`, ν).
The GL′,r construction. To prove finite optimality of SPTGs and to establish correctness
of our algorithm, we rely in both cases on a construction that consists in decomposing G
into a sequence of SPTGs with more urgent locations. Intuitively, a game with more urgent
locations is easier to solve since it is closer to an untimed game (in particular, when all
locations are urgent, we can apply the techniques of Section 3). More precisely, given a
set L′ of non-urgent locations, and a valuation r0 ∈ [0, 1], we will define a (possibly infinite)
sequence of valuations 1 = r0 > r1 > · · · and a sequence GL′,r0 , GL′,r1 , . . . of SPTGs such
that (i) all locations of G are also present in each GL′,ri , except that the locations of L′
are now urgent; and (ii) for all i > 0, the value function of GL′,ri is equal to ValG on the
interval [ri+1, ri]. Hence, we can re-construct ValG by assembling well-chosen parts of the
values functions of the GL′,ri (assuming infi ri = 0). This basic result will be exploited in two
directions. First, we prove by induction on the number of urgent locations that all SPTGs are
finitely optimal, by re-constructing ValG (as well as optimal strategies) as a B-concatenation
of the value functions of a finite sequence of SPTGs with one more urgent locations. The
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base case, with only urgent locations, is solved by Proposition 4. This construction suggests
a recursive algorithm in the spirit of [10, 17] (for non-negative prices). Second, we show that
this recursion can be avoided (see Algorithm 2). Instead of turning locations urgent one at
a time, this algorithm makes them all urgent and computes directly the sequence of SPTGs
with only urgent locations. Its proof of correctness relies on the finite optimality of SPTGs
and, again, on our basic result linking the values functions of G and games GL′,ri .
Let us formalise these constructions. Let G be an SPTG, let r ∈ [0, 1] be an endpoint,
and let x = (x`)`∈L be a vector of rational values. Then, wait(G, r,x) is an r-SPTG in which
both players may now decide, in all non-urgent locations `, to wait until the clock takes value
r, and then to stop the game, adding the cost x` to the current cost of the play. Formally,
wait(G, r,x) = (LMin, LMax, L′f , Lu,ϕ′, T ′, pi′) is such that L′f = Lf unionmulti {`f | ` ∈ L \ Lu}; for
all `′ ∈ Lf and ν ∈ [0, r], ϕ′`′(ν) = ϕ`′(ν), for all ` ∈ L \ Lu, ϕ′`f (ν) = (r − ν) · pi(`) + x`;
T ′ = T ∪ {(`, [0, r],⊥, `f ) | ` ∈ L \ Lu}; for all δ ∈ T ′, pi′(δ) = pi(δ) if δ ∈ T , and pi′(δ) = 0
otherwise. Then, we let Gr = wait
(G, r, (ValG(`, r))`∈L), i.e., the game obtained thanks to
wait by letting x be the value of G in r. One can check that this first transformation does
not alter the value of the game, for valuations before r: ValG(`, ν) = ValGr (`, ν) for all ν 6 r.
Next, we make locations urgent. For a set L′ ⊆ L \ Lu of non-urgent locations, we let
GL′,r be the SPTG obtained from Gr by making urgent every location ` of L′. Observe that,
although all locations ` ∈ L′ are now urgent in GL′,r, their clones `f allow the players to wait
until r. When L′ is a singleton {`}, we write G`,r instead of G{`},r. While the construction
of Gr does not change the value of the game, introducing urgent locations does. Yet, we can
characterise an interval [a, r] on which the value functions of H = GL′,r and H+ = GL′∪{`},r
coincide, as stated by the next proposition. The interval [a, r] depends on the slopes of the
pieces of ValH+ as depicted in Figure 2: for each location ` of Min, the slopes of the pieces
of ValH+ contained in [a, r] should be 6 −pi(`) (and > −pi(`) when ` belongs to Max). It
is proved by lifting optimal strategies of H+ into H, and strongly relies on the determinacy
result of Theorem 1:
I Proposition 5. Let 0 6 a < r 6 1, L′ ⊆ L\Lu and ` /∈ L′∪Lu a non-urgent location of Min
(respectively, Max). Assume that GL′∪{`},r is finitely optimal, and for all a 6 ν1 < ν2 6 r
ValGL′∪{`},r (`, ν2)− ValGL′∪{`},r (`, ν1)
ν2 − ν1 > −pi(`) (respectively, 6 −pi(`)) . (1)
Then, for all ν ∈ [a, r] and `′ ∈ L, ValGL′∪{`},r (`′, ν) = ValGL′,r (`′, ν). Furthermore, fake-
optimal NC-strategies and optimal FP-strategies in GL′∪{`},r are also fake-optimal and op-
timal over [a, r] in GL′,r.
Given an SPTG G and some finitely optimal GL′,r, we now characterise precisely the
left endpoint of the maximal interval ending in r where the value functions of G and GL′,r
coincide, with the operator leftL′ : (0, 1]→ [0, 1] (or simply left, if L′ is clear) defined as:
leftL′(r) = sup{r′ 6 r | ∀` ∈ L ∀ν ∈ [r′, r] ValGL′,r (`, ν) = ValG(`, ν)} .
By continuity of the value (Theorem 1), this supremum exists and ValG(`, leftL′(r)) =
ValGL′,r (`, leftL′(r)). Moreover, ValG(`) is a cost function on [left(r), r], since GL′,r is fi-
nitely optimal. However, this definition of left(r) is semantical. Yet, building on the ideas of
Proposition 5, we can effectively compute left(r), given ValGL′,r . We claim that leftL′(r) is
the minimal valuation such that for all locations ` ∈ L′ ∩LMin (respectively, ` ∈ L′ ∩LMax),
the slopes of the affine sections of the cost function ValGL′,r (`) on [left(r), r] are at least (at
most) −pi(`) (see Lemma 20 in appendix). Hence, left(r) can be obtained (see Figure 3),
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ValG`,r (`, ν)
νa r
•
•
ν1 ν2
ValG`,r (`, ν1)
ValG`,r (`, ν2)
Figure 2 The condition (1) (in the case
L′ = ∅ and ` ∈ LMin): graphically, it means
that the slope between any two points of the
plot in [a, r] (represented with a thick line) is
greater than or equal to −pi(`) (represented
with dashed line).
ValG`?,r (`?, ν)
ν
ValG(`?, r)
left(r) r
Figure 3 In this example L′ = {`?} and
`? ∈ LMin. left(r) is the leftmost point such
that all slopes on its right are smaller than or
equal to −pi(`?) in the graph of ValG`?,r (`?, ν).
Dashed lines have slope −pi(`?).
by inspecting iteratively, for all ` of Min (respectively, Max), the slopes of ValGL′,r (`), by
decreasing valuations, until we find a piece with a slope > −pi(`) (respectively, < −pi(`)).
This enumeration of the slopes is effective as ValGL′,r has finitely many pieces, by hypothesis.
Moreover, this guarantees that left(r) < r. Thus, one can reconstruct ValG on [infi ri, r0]
from the value functions of the (potentially infinite) sequence of games GL′,r0 , GL′,r1 , . . .
where ri+1 = left(ri) for all i such that ri > 0, for all possible choices of non-urgent loca-
tions L′. Next, we will define two different ways of choosing L′: the former to prove finite
optimality of all SPTGs, the latter to obtain an algorithm to solve them.
SPTGs are finitely optimal. To prove finite optimality of all SPTGs we reason by induction
on the number of non-urgent locations and instantiate the previous results to the case where
L′ = {`?} where `? is a non-urgent location of minimum price-rate (i.e., for all ` ∈ L,
pi(`?) 6 pi(`)). Given r0 ∈ [0, 1], we let r0 > r1 > · · · be the decreasing sequence of
valuations such that ri = left`?(ri−1) for all i > 0. As explained before, we will build ValG
on [infi ri, r0] from the value functions of games G`?,ri . Assuming finite optimality of those
games, this will prove that G is finitely optimal under the condition that r0 > r1 > · · ·
eventually stops, i.e., ri = 0 for some i. This property is given by the next lemma, which
ensures that, for all i, the owner of `? has a strictly better strategy in configuration (`?, ri+1)
than waiting until ri in location `?.
I Lemma 6. If G`?,ri is finitely optimal for all i > 0, then (i) if `? ∈ LMin (respect-
ively, LMax), ValG(`?, ri+1) < ValG(`?, ri) + (ri − ri+1)pi(`?) (respectively, ValG(`?, ri+1) >
ValG(`?, ri) + (ri − ri+1)pi(`?)), for all i; and (ii) there is i 6 |FG |2 + 2 such that ri = 0.
By iterating this construction, we make all locations urgent iteratively, and obtain:
I Proposition 7. Every SPTG G is finitely optimal and for all locations `, ValG(`) has at
most O
(
(Πtr|L|2)2|L|+2) cutpoints.
Proof. As announced, we show by induction on n > 0 that every r-SPTG G with n non-
urgent locations is finitely optimal, and that the number of cutpoints of ValG(`) is at most
O
(
(Πtr(|Lf |+ n2))2n+2
)
, which suffices to show the above bound, since |Lf |+ n2 6 |L|2.
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The base case n = 0 is given by Proposition 4. Now, assume that G has at least
one non-urgent location, and consider `? one with minimum price. By induction hypo-
thesis, all r′-SPTGs G`?,r′ are finitely optimal for all r′ ∈ [0, r]. Let r0 > r1 > · · ·
be the decreasing sequence defined by r0 = r and ri = left`?(ri−1) for all i > 1. By
Lemma 6, there exists j 6 |FG |2 + 2 such that rj = 0. Moreover, for all 0 < i 6 j,
ValG = ValG`?,ri−1 on [ri, ri−1] by definition of ri = left`?(ri−1), so that ValG(`) is a cost
function on this interval, for all `, and the number of cutpoints on this interval is bounded
by O
(
(Πtr(|Lf |+ (n− 1)2 + n))2(n−1)+2
)
= O
(
(Πtr(|Lf |+ n2))2(n−1)+2
)
by induction hy-
pothesis (notice that maximal transition prices are the same in G and G`?,ri−1 , but that we
add n more final locations in G`?,ri−1). Adding the cutpoint 1, summing over i from 0 to
j 6 |FG |2 + 2, and observing that |FG | 6 2Πtr|Lf |, we bound the number of cutpoints of
ValG(`) by O
(
(Πtr(|Lf |+ n2))2n+2
)
. Finally, we can reconstruct fake-optimal and optimal
strategies in G from the from fake-optimal and optimal strategies of G`?,ri . J
Computing the value functions. The finite optimality of SPTGs allows us to compute the
value functions. The proof of Proposition 7 suggests a recursive algorithm to do so: from an
SPTG G with minimal non-urgent location `?, solve recursively G`?,1, G`?,left(1), G`?,left(left(1)),
etc. handling the base case where all locations are urgent with Algorithm 1. While our results
above show that this is correct and terminates, we propose instead to solve—without the
need for recursion—the sequence of games GL\Lu,1, GL\Lu,left(1), . . . i.e., making all locations
urgent at once. Again, the arguments given above prove that this scheme is correct, but
the key argument of Lemma 6 that ensures termination can not be applied in this case.
Instead, we rely on the following lemma, stating, that there will be at least one cutpoint
of ValG in each interval [left(r), r]. Observe that this lemma relies on the fact that G is
finitely optimal, hence the need to first prove this fact independently with the sequence
G`?,1, G`?,left(1), G`?,left(left(1)),. . . Termination then follows from the fact that ValG has finitely
many cutpoints by finite optimality.
I Lemma 8. Let r0 ∈ (0, 1] such that GL′,r0 is finitely optimal. Suppose that r1 = leftL′(r0) >
0, and let r2 = leftL′(r1). There exists r′ ∈ [r2, r1) and ` ∈ L′ such that [(i)] (i) ValG(`) is
affine on [r′, r1], of slope equal to −pi(`), and (ii) ValG(`, r1) 6= ValG(`, r0) + pi(`)(r0 − r1).
As a consequence, ValG(`) has a cutpoint in [r1, r0).
Algorithm 2 implements these ideas. Each iteration of the while loop computes a
new game in the sequence GL\Lu,1, GL\Lu,left(1), . . . described above; solves it thanks to
solveInstant; and thus computes a new portion of ValG on an interval on the left of the
current point r ∈ [0, 1]. More precisely, the vector (ValG(`, 1))`∈L is first computed in line 1.
Then, the algorithm enters the while loop, and the game G′ obtained when reaching line 6
is GL\Lu,1. Then, the algorithm enters the repeat loop to analyse this game. Instead of
building the whole value function of G′, Algorithm 2 builds only the parts of ValG′ that co-
incide with ValG . It proceeds by enumerating the possible cutpoints a of ValG′ , starting in r,
by decreasing valuations (line 8), and computes the value of ValG′ in each cutpoint thanks
to solveInstant (line 9), which yields a new piece of ValG′ . Then, the if in line 10 checks
whether this new piece coincides with ValG , using the condition given by Proposition 5. If it
is the case, the piece of ValG′ is added to f` (line 11); repeat is stopped otherwise. When ex-
iting the repeat loop, variable b has value left(1). Hence, at the next iteration of the while
loop, G′ = GL\Lu,left(1) when reaching line 6. By continuing this reasoning inductively, one
concludes that the successive iterations of the while loop compute the sequence GL\Lu,1,
GL\Lu,left(1), . . . as announced, and rebuilds ValG from them. Termination in exponential
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Algorithm 2: solve(G)
Input: SPTG G = (LMin, LMax, Lf , Lu,ϕ,∆, pi)
1 f = (f`)`∈L := solveInstant(G, 1) /* f` : {1} → R */
2 r := 1
3 while 0 < r do /* Invariant: f` : [r, 1]→ R */
4 G′ := wait(G, r,f(r)) /* r-SPTG G′ = (LMin, LMax, L′f , L′u,ϕ′, T ′, pi′) */
5 L′u := L′u ∪ L /* every location is made urgent */
6 b := r
7 repeat /* Invariant:f` : [b, 1]→ R */
8 a := max(PossCPG′ ∩ [0, b))
9 x = (x`)`∈L := solveInstant(G′, a) /* x` = ValG′(`, a) */
10 if ∀` ∈ LMin f`(b)−x`b−a 6 −pi(`) ∧ ∀` ∈ LMax f`(b)−x`b−a > −pi(`) then
11 foreach ` ∈ L do f` :=
(
ν ∈ [a, b] 7→ f`(b) + (ν − b) f`(b)−x`b−a
)
B f`
12 b := a ; stop := false
13 else stop := true
14 until b = 0 or stop
15 r := b
16 return f
time is ensured by Lemma 8: each iteration of the while loop discovers at least one new
cutpoint of ValG , and there are at most exponentially many (note that a tighter bound on
this number of cutpoints would entail a better complexity of our algorithm).
I Example 9. Let us briefly sketch the execution of Algorithm 2 on the SPTG in Figure 1.
During the first iteration of the while loop, the algorithm computes the correct value func-
tions until the cutpoint 34 : in the repeat loop, at first a = 9/10 but the slope in `1 is smaller
than the slope that would be granted by waiting, as depicted in Figure 1. Then, a = 3/4
where the algorithm gives a slope of value −16 in `2 while the cost of this location of Max
is −14. During the first iteration of the while loop, the inner repeat loop thus ends with
r = 3/4. The next iterations of the while loop end with r = 12 (because `1 does not pass the
test in line 10); r = 14 (because of `2) and finally with r = 0, giving us the value functions
on the entire interval [0, 1]. All value functions are in Figure 12 in the appendix.
5 Beyond SPTGs
In [10, 17, 15], general PTGs with non-negative prices are solved by reducing them to a finite
sequence of SPTGs, by eliminating guards and resets. It is thus natural to try and adapt
these techniques to our general case, in which case Algorithm 2 would allow us to solve
general PTGs with arbitrary costs. Let us explain why it is not (completely) the case. The
technique used to remove guards from PTGs consists in enhancing the locations with regions
while keeping an equivalent game. This technique can be adapted to arbitrary weights, see
Appendix H for a proof adapted from [15, Lemma 4.6].
The technique to handle resets, however, consists in bounding the number of clock resets
that can occur in any play following an optimal strategy of Min or Max. Then, the PTG can
be unfolded into a reset-acyclic PTG with the same value. By reset-acyclic, we mean that
no cycle in the configuration graph visits a transition with a reset. This reset-acyclic PTG
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x = 1, x := 0
1
Figure 4 A PTG where the number of resets in optimal plays can not be bounded a priori.
can be decomposed into a finite number of components that contain no reset and are linked
by transitions with resets. These components can be solved iteratively, from the bottom to
the top, turning them into SPTGs. Thus, if we assume that the PTGs we are given as input
are reset-acyclic, we can solve them in exponential time, and show that their value functions
are cost functions with at most exponentially many cutpoints, using our techniques (see
Appendix H). Unfortunately, the arguments to bound the number of resets do not hold for
arbitrary costs, as shown by the PTG in Figure 4. We claim that Val(`0) = 0; that Min has
no optimal strategy, but a family of ε-optimal strategies σεMin each with value ε; and that
each σεMin requires memory whose size depends on ε and might yield a play visiting at least
1/ε times the reset between `0 and `1 (hence the number of resets can not be bounded). For
all ε > 0, σεMin consists in: waiting 1− ε time units in `0, then going to `1 during the d1/εe
first visits to `0; and to go directly to `f afterwards. Against σεMin, Max has two possible
choices: (i) either wait 0 time unit in `1, wait ε time units in `2, then reach `f ; or (ii) wait
ε time unit in `1 then force the cycle by going back to `0 and wait for Min’s next move.
Thus, all plays according to σεMin will visit a sequence of locations which is either of the form
`0(`1`0)k`1`2`f , with 0 6 k < d1/εe; or of the form `0(`1`0)d 1εe`f . In the former case, the
cost of the play will be −kε+ 0 + ε = −(k − 1)ε 6 ε; in the latter, −ε(d1/εe) + 1 6 0. This
shows that Val(`0) = 0, but there is no optimal strategy as none of these strategies allow
one to guarantee a cost of 0 (neither does the strategy that waits 1 time unit in `0).
However, we may apply the result on reset-acyclic PTGs to obtain:
I Theorem 10. The value functions of all one-clock PTGs are cost functions with at most
exponentially many cutpoints.
Proof. Let G be a one-clock PTG. Let us replace all transitions (`, g,>, `′) resetting the
clock by (`, g,⊥, `′′), where `′′ is a new final location with ϕ`′′ = ValG(`, 0)—observe that
ValG(`, 0) exists even if we can not compute it, so this transformation is well-defined. This
yields a reset-acyclic PTG G′ such that ValG′ = ValG . J
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A Existence and continuity of the value functions: proof of Theorem 1
We start with the proof of determinacy. For all k ∈ R, define Threshold(G, r) as the qualitative game which is
played like G, and only the objective of Min is altered (in order to make it qualitative): now Min wins a play if
and only if the cost of the play is 6 k. Further, let P (k) be the set of prefixes of runs ending in a final vertex and
whose cost is less than or equal to k. Then the set of winning plays for Min in this game is S =
⋃
ρ∈P (k) Cone(ρ)
where Cone(ρ) denotes the set of plays having ρ as a prefix. The set S is an open set in the topology induced
by cones. In [14], it is shown that in any game whose set of winning plays is an open set is determined, i.e. one
of the two players has a winning strategy. Therefore Threshold(G, k) is determined for all k.
Now let us prove that ValG = ValG . First, recall that, by definition of ValG and ValG :
ValG(c) 6 ValG(c) (2)
for all configurations c. Fix a configuration c. We consider several cases:
1. First assume that ValG(c) ∈ R. By definition, for all k > ValG(c) and all strategies σMax, ValσMaxG (c) < k.
Hence, for all k > ValG(c), Max has no winning strategy in the game Threshold(G, k). Therefore, by
determinacy of this game, Min has a winning strategy. Equivalently, for all k > ValG(c), there exists σkMin
such that Valσ
k
Min
G (c) 6 k. This implies that:
ValG(c) 6 ValG(c) (3)
Hence, by (3) and (2) we conclude that: ValG(c) = ValG(c) when these values are finite.
2. In the case where ValG(c) = +∞, we conclude, by (2) that ValG(c) = +∞ too.
3. Finally, in the case where ValG(c) = −∞ then for all k, Max has no winning strategy for Threshold(G, k).
Therefore, by determinacy, Min has a winning strategy σkMin in Threshold(G, k). Thus, for all k: ValG 6
Valσ
k
Min
G (c) 6 k, and: ValG = −∞.
We then turn to the proof of continuity. Therefore, our goal is to show that for every location `, region
r ∈ RegG and valuations ν and ν′ in r,
|Val(`, ν)− Val(`, ν′)| 6 Πloc|ν − ν′|.
This is equivalent to showing
Val(`, ν) 6 Val(`, ν′) + Πloc|ν − ν′| and Val(`, ν′) 6 Val(`, ν) + Πloc|ν − ν′| .
As those two equations are symmetric with respect to ν and ν′, we only have to show either of them. We will
thus focus on the latter, which, by using the upper value, can be reformulated as: for all strategies σMin of Min,
there exists a strategy σ′Min such that Valσ
′
Min(`, ν′) 6 ValσMin(`, ν) + Πloc|ν − ν′|. Note that this last equation
is equivalent to say that there exists a function g mapping plays ρ′ from (`, ν′), consistent with σ′Min (i.e., such
that ρ′ = Play((`, ν′), σ′Min, σMax) for some strategy σMax of Max) to plays from (`, ν), consistent with σMin, such
that
Cost(ρ′) 6 Cost(g(ρ′)) + Πloc|ν − ν′| .
Let r ∈ RegG , ν, ν′ ∈ r and σMin be a strategy of Min. We define σ′Min and g by induction on the size of their
arguments; more precisely, we define σ′Min(ρ′1) and g(ρ′2) by induction on k, for all plays ρ′1 and ρ′2 from (`, ν′),
consistent with σ′Min of size k − 1 and k, respectively. We also show during this induction that for each play
ρ′ = (`1, ν′1)
c′1−→ · · · c
′
k−1−−−→ (`k, ν′k) from (`, ν′), consistent with σ′Min), if we let (`1, ν1) c1−→ · · ·
c`−1−−−→ (`k, ν`) = g(ρ′):
(i) ρ′ and g(ρ′) have the same length, i.e., |ρ| = ` = k = |ρ′|,
(ii) for every i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, νi and ν′i are in the same region, i.e., there exists a region r′ ∈ RegG such that
νi ∈ r′ and ν′i ∈ r′,
(iii) |νk − ν′k| 6 |ν − ν′|,
(iv) Cost(ρ′) 6 Cost(g(ρ′)) + Πloc(|ν − ν′| − |νn − ν′n|).
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Figure 5 The definition of t′ when (a) ν′k 6 νk, (b) νk < ν′k < νk + t, (c) νk < νk + t < ν′k.
Notice that no property is required on the strategy σ′Min for finite plays that do not start in (`, ν′).
If k = 1, as there is no play of length 0, nothing has to be done to define σ′Min. Moreover, in that case,
ρ′ = (`, ν′) and g(ρ′) = (`, ν). Both plays have size 1, ν and ν′ are in the same region by hypothesis of the
lemma, and Cost(ρ′) = Cost(g(ρ′)) = 0, therefore all four properties are true.
Let us suppose now that the construction is done for a given k > 1, and perform it for k + 1. We start
with the construction of σ′Min. To that extent, consider a play ρ′ = (`1, ν′1)
c′1−→ · · · c
′
k−1−−−→ (`k, ν′k) from (`, ν′),
consistent with σ′Min such that `k is a location of player Min. Let t and δ be the choice of delay and transition
made by σMin on g(ρ′), i.e., σMin(g(ρ′)) = (t, δ). Then, we define σ′Min(ρ′) = (t′, δ) where t′ = max(0, νk+ t−ν′k).
The delay t′ respects the guard of transition δ since either νk + t = ν′k + t′ or νk 6 νk + t 6 ν′k, in which case
ν′k is in the same region as νk + t since νk and ν′k are in the same region. This is illustrated in Figure 5.
We now build the mapping g. Let ρ′ = (`1, ν′1)
c′1−→ · · · c
′
k−→ (`k+1, ν′k+1) be a play from (`, ν′) consistent with
σ′Min and ρ˜′ = (`1, ν′1)
c′1−→ · · · c
′
k−1−−−→ (`k, ν′k) its prefix of size k. Let (t′, δ) be the delay and transition taken after
ρ˜′. Using the construction of g over plays of length k by induction, the play g(ρ˜′) = (`1, ν1)
c1−→ · · · ck−1−−−→ (`k, νk)
(with (`1, ν1) = (`, ν)) verifies properties (i), (ii) and (iii). If `k is a location of Min and σMin(g(ρ˜′)) = (t, δ),
then g(ρ′) = g(ρ˜′) ck−→ (`k+1, νk+1) is obtained by applying those choices on g(ρ˜′). If `k is a location of Max, the
last valuation νk+1 of g(ρ′) is rather obtained by choosing action (t, δ) verifying t = max(0, ν′k + t′ − νk). Note
that transition δ is allowed since both νk + t and ν′k + t′ are in the same region (for similar reasons as above).
By induction hypothesis |ρ˜′| = |g(ρ˜′)|, thus (i) holds, i.e., |ρ′| = |g(ρ′)|. Moreover, νk+1 and ν′k+1 are also
in the same region as either they are equal to νk + t and ν′k + t′, respectively, or δ contains a reset in which
case νk+1 = ν′k+1 = 0 which proves (ii). To prove (iii), notice that we always have either νk + t = ν′k + t′ or
νk 6 νk+ t 6 ν′k = ν′k+ t′ or ν′k 6 ν′k+ t 6 νk = νk+ t. In all of these possibilities, we have |(νk+ t)− (ν′k+ t)| 6
|νk − ν′k|. By noticing again that either νk+1 = νk + t and ν′k+1 = ν′k + t′, or δ contains a reset in which case
νk+1 = ν′k+1 = 0, we conclude the proof of (iii). We finally check property (iv). In both cases:
Cost(ρ′) = Cost(ρ˜′) + pi(δ) + t′pi(`k)
6 Cost(g(ρ˜′)) + Πloc(|ν − ν′| − |νk − ν′k|) + pi(δ) + t′pi(`k)
= Cost(g(ρ′)) + (t′ − t)pi(`k) + Πloc(|ν − ν′| − |νk − ν′k|) .
If δ contains no reset, let us prove that
|t′ − t| = |νk − ν′k| − |ν′k+1 − νk+1| . (4)
Indeed, since t′ = ν′k+1− ν′k and t = νk+1− νk, we have |t′− t| = |ν′k+1− ν′k − (νk+1− νk)|. Then, two cases are
possible: either t′ = max(0, νk + t− ν′k) or t = max(0, ν′k + t′ − νk). So we have three different possibilities:
if t′ + ν′k = t+ νk, ν′k+1 = νk+1, thus |t′ − t| = |νk − ν′k| = |νk − ν′k| − |ν′k+1 − νk+1|.
if t = 0, then νk = νk+1 > ν′k+1 > ν′k, thus |ν′k+1− ν′k− (νk+1− νk)| = ν′k+1− ν′k = (νk− ν′k)− (νk− ν′k+1) =
|νk − ν′k| − |ν′k+1 − νk+1|.
if t′ = 0, then ν′k = ν′k+1 > νk+1 > νk, thus |ν′k+1−ν′k− (νk+1−νk)| = νk+1−νk = (ν′k−νk)− (ν′k−νk+1) =
|νk − ν′k| − |ν′k+1 − νk+1|.
If δ contains a reset, then ν′k+1 = νk+1. If t′ = νk + t− ν′k, we have that |t′ − t| = |νk − ν′k|. Otherwise, either
t = 0 and t′ 6 νk − ν′k, or t′ = 0 and t 6 ν′k − νk.
In all cases, we have proved (4). Coupled with the fact that |P (`k)| 6 Πloc, we conclude that:
Cost(ρ′) 6 Cost(g(ρ′)) + Πloc(|ν − ν′| − |νk+1 − ν′k+1|) .
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Figure 6 A PTG with 2 clocks whose value function is not continuous inside a region
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Figure 7 An SPTG where Min needs memory to play optimally
Now that σ′Min and g are defined (noticing that g is stable by prefix, we extend naturally its definition to
infinite plays), notice that for all play ρ′ from (`, ν′) consistent with σ′Min, either ρ′ does not reach a final location
and its cost is +∞, but in this case g(ρ′) has also cost +∞; or ρ′ is finite. In this case let ν′k be the clock
valuation of its last configuration, and νk be the clock valuation of the last configuration of g(ρ′). Combining
(iii) and (iv) we have Cost(ρ′) 6 Cost(g(ρ′)) + Πloc|ν − ν′| which concludes the proof.
B Non-continuity of the value function with more than one clock
Let us consider the example in Figure 6 (that we describe informally since we did not properly define games
with multiple clocks), with clocks x and y. One can easily check that, starting from a configuration (`0, 0, 0.5) in
location `0 and where x = 0 and y = 0.5, the following cycle can be taken: (`0, 0, 0.5)
0,δ0,0−−−→ (`1, 0, 0.5) 0.5,δ1,2.5−−−−−−→
(`2, 0.5, 0)
0.5,δ2,−2.5−−−−−−−→ (`0, 0, 0.5), where δ0, δ1 and δ2 denote respectively the transitions from `0 to `1; from
`1 to `2; and from `2 to `0. Observe that the cost of this cycle is null, and that no other delays can be
played, hence Val(`0, 0, 0.5) = 0. However, starting from a configuration (`0, 0, 0.6), and following the same
path, yields the cycle (`0, 0, 0.6)
0,e0,0−−−−→ (`1, 0, 0.6) 0.4,e1,2−−−−−→ (`2, 0.4, 0) 0.6,e2,−3−−−−−−→ (`0, 0, 0.6) with cost −1. Hence,
Val(`0, 0, 0.6) = −∞, and the function is not continuous although both valuations (0, 0.5) and (0, 0.6) are in
the same region. Observe that this holds even for priced timed automata, since our example requires only one
player.
C Memory is required for Min to play optimally
As an example, consider the SPTG of Figure 7, where W is a positive integer, and every location has price-
rate 0: hence, this game can be seen as an (untimed) min-cost reachability game as studied in [12], where it
has been initially studied. We claim that the values of locations `1 and `2 are both −W . Indeed, consider the
following strategy for Min: during each of the first W visits to `2 (if any), go to `1; else, go to `f . Clearly, this
strategy ensures that the final location `f will eventually be reached, and that either (i) transition (`1, `3) (with
weight −W ) will eventually be traversed; or (ii) transition (`1, `2) (with weight −1) will be traversed at leastW
times. Hence, in all plays following this strategy, the cost will be at most −W . This strategy allows Min to
secure −W , but he can not ensure a lower cost, since Max always has the opportunity to take the transition
(`1, `f ) (with weight −W ) instead of cycling between `1 and `2. Hence, Max’s optimal choice is to follow the
transition (`1, `f ) as soon as `1 is reached, securing a cost of −W . The Min strategy we have just given is
optimal, and there is no optimal memoryless strategy for Min. Indeed, always playing (`2, `f ) does not ensure
a cost at most −W ; and, always playing (`2, `1) does not guarantee to reach the target, and this strategy has
thus value +∞.
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D Fake-optimality: proof of Lemma 3
First of all, notice that all finite plays ρ ∈ Play(σMin) with all clock valuations in the same interval I of int(σ)
verify Cost(ρ) 6 |I|Πloc + |L|Πtr − |ρ|/|L|. Indeed, the cost of ρ is the sum of the cost generated by staying in
locations, which is bounded by |I|Πloc, and the cost of the transitions. One can extract at least |ρ|/|L| cycles
with transition prices as most −1 (by definition of an NC-strategy), and what remains is of size at most |L|,
ensuring that the transition cost is bounded by |L|Πtr − |ρ|/|L|.
Then, by splitting runs among intervals of int(σMin), we can easily obtain that all finite plays ρ ∈ Play(σMin)
verify Cost(ρ) 6 Πloc + (2|σMin| − 1) × |L|Πtr − (|ρ| − |σMin|)/|L|. Indeed, letting I1, I2, . . . , Ik the interval of
int(σMin) visited during ρ (with k 6 |σMin|), one can split ρ into k runs ρ = ρ1 c1−→ ρ2 c2−→ · · · ρk such that in ρi
all clock values are in Ii (remember that SPTGs contain no reset transitions). By the previous inequality, we
have Cost(ρi) 6 |Ii|Πloc + |L|Πtr−|ρi|/|L|. Thus, also splitting costs ci with respect to discrete cost and cost of
delaying, we obtain Cost(ρ) =
∑k
i=1 Cost(ρi) +
∑k−1
i=1 ci 6 (2|σMin| − 1)× |L|Πtr + Πloc − (|ρ| − |σMin|)/|L, since
|ρ| 6∑i |ρi|+ k 6∑i |ρi|+ |σMin| and ∑i |Ii| 6 1.
We now turn to the proof of the lemma. To that extent, we suppose known an attractor strategy for Min,
i.e., a strategy that ensures to reach a final location: it exists thanks to the hypothesis on the finiteness of the
values. From every configuration, it reaches a final location with a cost bounded above by a given constant M .
Notice first that, with the hypothesis that no configuration has a value −∞ in the SPTG we consider, it is
not possible that fakeσMinG (s) = −∞ for a configuration s (i.e., that no runs of Play(s, σMin) reach the target).
Indeed, consider the strategy σ′Min obtained by playing σMin until having computed a cost bounded above by a
fixed integer N ∈ Z, in which case we switch to the attractor strategy. By the previous inequality, the switch
is sure to happen since the right term tends to −∞ when the length of ρ tends to ∞. Then, we know that
the value guaranteed by σ′Min is at most N , implying that the optimal value Val(s) is −∞, which contradicts
the hypothesis. Then, to prove the result of the lemma, consider the strategy σ′Min obtained by playing σMin
until having computed a cost bounded above by the finite value fakeσMinG (s) −M , in which case we switch to
the attractor strategy. Once again, the switch is sure to happen, implying that every play conforming to σMin
reaches the target: moreover, the cost of such a play is necessarily at most fakeσMin(s) by construction. Then,
we directly obtain that Valσ
′
Min
G (s) 6 fake
σMin
G (s).
E SPTGs with only urgent locations: extended version of Section 3
We rely on the proofs of [12] that can easily be adapted in our case, even though we must give the whole
explanation here, knowing that prices coming from goal functions can be rational, and hence do not strictly fall
in the framework of [12].
Since all locations in G are urgent, we may extract from a play ρ = (`0, ν) c0−→ (`1, ν) c1−→ · · · the clock
valuations, as well as prices ci = pi(`i, `i+1), hence denoting plays by their sequence of locations `0`1 · · · . The
cost of this play is Cost(ρ) = +∞ if `k 6∈ Lf for all k > 0; and Cost(ρ) =
∑k−1
i=0 pi(`i, `i+1) + ϕ`k(ν) if k is the
least position such that `k ∈ Lf .
E.1 Computing the value for a particular valuation
Let us show how to compute the vector Valν = (Val(`, ν))`∈L, for a given ν ∈ [0, r], in terms of a sequence
of values. Following the arguments of [12], we first observe that locations ` with values Valν(`) = +∞ and
Valν(`) = −∞ can be pre-computed (using respectively attractor and mean-payoff techniques) and removed
from the game without changing the values of the other nodes. Then, because of the particular structure of the
game G (where a real cost is paid only on the target location, all other prices being integers), for all plays ρ,
Cost(ρ) is a value from the set Zν,ϕ = Z+ {ϕ`(ν) | ` ∈ Lf}. We further define Z+∞ν,ϕ = Zν,ϕ ∪ {+∞}. Clearly,
Zν,ϕ contains at most |Lf | values between two consecutive integers, i.e.,
∀i ∈ Z |[i, i+ 1] ∩ Zν,ϕ| 6 |Lf | (5)
Then, we define an operator F : (Z+∞ν,ϕ )L → (Z+∞ν,ϕ )L mapping every vector x = (x`)`∈L of (Z+∞ν,ϕ )L to
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F(x) = (F(x)`)`∈L defined by
F(x)` =

ϕ`(ν) if ` ∈ Lf
max
(`,`′)∈∆
(
pi(`, `′) + x`′
)
if ` ∈ LMax
min
(`,`′)∈∆
(
pi(`, `′) + x`′
)
if ` ∈ LMin .
We will obtain Valν as the limit of the sequence (x(i))i>0 defined by x(0)` = +∞ if ` 6∈ Lf , and x(0)` = ϕ`(ν) if
` ∈ Lf , and then x(i) = F(x(i−1)) for i > 0.
The intuition behind is that xi is the value of the game (when the clock takes value ν) if we impose that
Min must reach the target within i steps (and get a payoff of +∞ if it fails to do so). Formally, for a play
ρ = `0`1 · · · , we let Cost6i(ρ) = Cost(ρ) if `k ∈ Lf for some k 6 i, and Cost6i(ρ) = +∞ otherwise. We further
let Val6i(`) = infσMin supσMax Cost
6i(Play((`, ν), σMax, σMin)) (where σMax and σMin are respectively strategies of
Max and Min). Lemma 1 of [12] allows us to easily obtain that
I Lemma 11. For all i > 0, and ` ∈ L: x(i)` = Val
6i(`).
Now, let us study how the sequence (Val6i)i>0 behaves and converges to the finite values of the game. Using
again the same arguments as in [12] (F is a monotonic and Scott-continuous operator over the complete lattice
(Z+∞ν,ϕ )L, etc), the sequence (Val
6i)i>0 converges towards the greatest fixed point of F . Let us now show that
Valν is actually this greatest fixed point. First, Corollary 1 of [12] can be adapted to obtain
I Lemma 12. For all ` ∈ L: Val6|L|(`) 6 |L|Πtr + Πfin .
The next step is to show that the values that can be computed along the sequence (still assuming that
Valν(`) is finite for all `) are taken from a finite set:
I Lemma 13. For all i > 0 and for all ` ∈ L:
Val6|L|+i(`) ∈ PossValν = [−(|L| − 1)Πtr −Πfin, |L|Πtr + Πfin] ∩ Zν,ϕ
where PossValν has cardinality bounded by |Lf | ×
(
(2|L| − 1)Πtr + 2Πfin + 1).
Proof. Following the proof of [12, Lemma 3], it is easy to show that if Min can secure, from some vertex `, a
cost less than −(|L| − 1)Πtr −Πfin, i.e., Val(`, ν) < −(|L| − 1)Πtr −Πfin, then it can secure an arbitrarily small
cost from that configuration, i.e., Val(`, ν) = −∞, which contradicts our hypothesis that the value is finite.
Hence, for all i > 0, for all `: Val6i(`) > Valν(`) > −(|L| − 1)Πtr − Πfin. By Lemma 12 and since the
sequence is non-increasing, we conclude that, for all i > 0 and for all ` ∈ L:
−(|L| − 1)Πtr −Πfin < Val6|L|+i(`) 6 |L|Πtr + Πfin .
Since all Val6|L|+i(`) are also in Zν,ϕ, we conclude that Val
6|L|+i(`) ∈ PossValν for all i > 0. The upper bound
on the size of PossValν is established by (5). J
This allows us to bound the number of iterations needed for the sequence to stabilise. The worst case is
where all locations are assigned a value bounded below by −(|L| − 1)Πtr −Πfin from the highest possible value
where all vertices are assigned a value bounded above by |L|Πtr + Πfin, which is itself reached after |L| steps.
Hence:
I Corollary 14. The sequence (Val6i)i>0 stabilises after a number of steps at most |Lf | × |L| ×
(
(2|L| − 1)Πtr +
2Πfin + 1
)
+ |L|.
Finally, the proofs of [12, Lemma 4 and Corollary 2] allow us to conclude that this sequence converges
towards the value Valν of the game (when all values are finite), which proves that the value iteration scheme of
Algorithm 1 computes exactly Valν for all ν ∈ [0, r]. Indeed, this algorithm also works when some values are
not finite. As a corollary, we obtain a characterisation of the possible values of G:
I Corollary 15. For all r-SPTG G with only urgent locations, for all location ` ∈ L and valuation ν ∈ [0, r],
ValG(`, ν) is contained in the set PossValν ∪ {−∞,+∞} of cardinal O(poly(|L|,Πtr,Πfin)), pseudo-polynomial
with respect to the size of G.
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Figure 8 Network of affine functions defined by FG : functions in bold are final affine functions of G, whereas non-bold
ones are their translations with weights k ∈ [−(|L| − 1)Πtr, |L|Πtr] ∩ Z. PossCPG is the set of abscisses of intersections
points, represented by black disks.
Finally, Section 3.4 and 3.5 of [12] explain how to compute simultaneously optimal strategies for both players.
In our context, this allows us to obtain for every valuation ν ∈ [0, r] and location ` of an r-SPTG, such that
Val(`, ν) /∈ {−∞,+∞}, a memoryless optimal strategy for Max, and an optimal switching strategy for Min: a
switching strategy is described by a pair (σ1Min, σ2Min) of memoryless strategies and a switch threshold K, so that
the optimal strategy is obtained by playing σ1Min until the value of the current finite play is below K, in which
case, we switch to strategy σ2Min, that can be taken as an attractor strategy, that only wants to reach a final
location.
E.2 Study of the complete value functions: G is finitely optimal
Still for an r-SPTG with only urgent locations, we now study a precise characterisation of the functions
Val(`) : ν ∈ [0, r] 7→ Val(`, ν), for all `, in particular showing that these are cost functions of CF{[0,r]}.
We first define the set FG of affine functions over [0, r] as follows:
FG = {k + ϕ` | ` ∈ Lf ∧ k ∈ [−(|L| − 1)Πtr, |L|Πtr] ∩ Z}
Observe that this set is finite and that its cardinality is 2|L|2Πtr, pseudo-polynomial in the size of G. Moreover,
as a direct consequence of Corollary 15, this set contains enough information to compute the value of the game
in each possible valuation of the clock, in the following sense:
I Lemma 16. For all ` ∈ L, for all ν ∈ [0, r]: if Val(`, ν) is finite, then there is f ∈ FG such that Val(`, ν) = f(ν).
We compute the set of intersections of two affine functions of FG :
PossCPG = {ν ∈ [0, r] | ∃f1, f2 ∈ FG f1 6= f2 ∧ f1(ν) = f2(ν)} .
This set is depicted in Figure 8 on an example. Observe that PossCPG contains at most |FG |2 points since
all functions from FG are affine, hence they can intersect at most once with every other function. Thus, the
cardinality of PossCPG is 4|Lf |4(Πtr)2, also bounded by a pseudo-polynomial in the size of G. Moreover, since
all functions of FG take rational values in 0 and r ∈ Q, we know that PossCPG ⊆ Q. This set contains all the
cutpoints of the value function of G, as shown in Proposition 4.
Notice, that this result allows us to compute Val(`) for every ` ∈ L. First, we compute the set PossCPG =
{y1, y2, . . . , y`}, which can be done in pseudo-polynomial time in the size of G. Then, for all 1 6 i 6 `, we can
compute the vectors
(
Val(`, yi)
)
`∈L of values in each location when the clock takes value yi using Algorithm 1.
This provides the value of Val(`) in each cutpoint, for all locations `, which is sufficient to characterise the whole
value function, as it is continuous and piecewise affine. Observe that all cutpoints, and values in the cutpoints,
in the value function are rational numbers, so Algorithm 1 is effective. Thanks to the above discussions, this
procedure consists in a pseudo-polynomial number of calls to a pseudo-polynomial algorithm, hence, it runs in
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pseudo-polynomial time. This allows us to conclude that ValG(`) is a cost function for all `. This proves item
(iii) of the definition of finite optimality for SPTGs with only urgent locations
Let us conclude the proof that SPTGs are finitely optimal by showing that Min has a fake-optimal NC-
strategy, and Max has an optimal FP-strategy. Let ν1, ν2, . . . , νk be the sequence of elements from PossCPG in
increasing order, and let us assume ν0 = 0. For all 0 6 i 6 k let f `i be the function from FG that defines the
piece of ValG(`) in the interval [νi−1, νi] (we have shown above that such an f `i always exists). Formally, for all
0 6 i 6 k, f `i ∈ FG verifies Val(`, ν) = f `i (ν), for all ν ∈ [ν`i−1, ν`i ]. Next, for all 1 6 i 6 k, let µi be a value taken
in the middle of [νi−1, νi], i.e., µi = νi+νi−12 . Note that all µi’s are rational values since all νi’s are. By applying
solveInstant in each µi, we can compute (ValG(`, µi))`∈L, and we can extract an optimal memoryless strategy
σiMax for Max and an optimal switching strategy σiMin for Min. Thus we know that, for all ` ∈ L, playing σiMin
(respectively, σiMax) from (`, µi) allows Min (respectively, Max) to ensure a cost at most (respectively, at least)
ValG(`, µi) = f `i (µi). However, it is easy to check that the bound given by f `i (µi) holds in every valuation, i.e.,
for all `, for all ν
Valσ
i
Min
G (`, ν) 6 f `i (ν) and Val
σiMax
G (`, ν) > f `i (ν) .
This holds because: (i) Min can play σiMin from all clock valuations (in [0, r]) since we are considering an r-SPTG;
and (ii) Max does not have more possible strategies from an arbitrary valuation ν ∈ [0, r] than from µi, because
all locations are urgent and time can not elapse (neither from ν, nor from µi). And symmetrically for Max.
We conclude that Min can consistently play the same strategy σiMin from all configurations (`, ν) with
ν ∈ [νi−1, νi] and secure a cost which is at most f `i (ν) = ValG(`, ν), i.e., σiMin is optimal on this interval.
By definition of σiMin, it is easy to extract from it a fake-optimal NC-strategy (actually, σiMin is a switching
strategy described by a pair (σ1Min, σ2Min), and σ1Min can be used to obtain the fake-optimal NC-strategy). The
same reasoning applies to strategies of Max and we conclude that Max has an optimal FP-strategy.
F Every SPTG is finitely optimal
We start with an auxiliary lemma showing a property of the rates of change of the value functions associated
to non-urgent locations
I Lemma 17. Let G be an r-SPTG, ` and `′ be non-urgent locations of Min and Max, respectively. Then for all
0 6 ν < ν′ 6 r:
ValG(`, ν′)− ValG(`, ν)
ν′ − ν > −pi(`) and
ValG(`′, ν′)− ValG(`′, ν)
ν′ − ν 6 −pi(`
′) .
Proof. For the location `, the inequality rewrites in
ValG(`, ν) 6 (ν′ − ν)pi(`) + ValG(`, ν′) .
Using the upper definition of the value (thanks to the determinacy result of Theorem 1), it suffices to prove,
for all ε > 0, the existence of a strategy σMin such that for all strategies σMax of the opponent
Cost(Play((`, ν), σMin, σMax)) 6 (ν′ − ν)pi(`) + ValG(`, ν′) + ε .
The definition of the value implies the existence of a strategy σ′Min such that for all strategies σMax
Cost(Play((`, ν′), σ′Min, σMax)) 6 ValG(`, ν′) + ε .
Then, σMin can be obtained by playing from (`, ν), at the first turn, as prescribed by σ′Min but delaying ν′ − ν
time units more (that we are allowed to do since ` is non-urgent), and, for other turns, directly like σ′Min. A
similar reasoning allows us to obtain the result for `′. J
Then, we observe that the construction of Gr does not alter the value of the game:
I Lemma 18. For all ν ∈ [0, r] and locations `, ValG(`, ν) = ValGr (`, ν).
Now, we turn our attention to the construction of GL′,r. We show that, even if the locations in L′ are turned
into urgent locations, we may still obtain for them a similar result of the rates of change as the one of Lemma 17:
I Lemma 19. For all locations ` ∈ L′ ∩ LMin (respectively, ` ∈ L′ ∩ LMax), and ν ∈ [0, r], ValGL′,r (`, ν) 6
(r − ν)pi(`) + ValG(`, r) (respectively, ValGL′,r (`, ν) > (r − ν)pi(`) + ValG(`, r) ).
Proof. It suffices to notice that from (`, ν), Min (respectively, Max) may choose to go directly in `f ensuring
the value (r − ν)pi(`) + ValG(`, r). J
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F.1 Proof of Proposition 5
Let σMin and σMax be a fake-optimal NC-strategy of Min and an optimal FP-strategy of Max in GL′∪{`},r,
respectively. Notice that both strategies are also well-defined finite positional strategies in GL′,r.
First, let us show that σMin is indeed an NC-strategy in GL′,r. Take a finite play (`0, ν0) c0−→ · · · ck−1−−−→ (`k, νk),
of length k > 2, that conforms with σMin in GL′,r, and with `0 = `k and ν0, νk in the same interval I of int(σMin).
For every `i that is in LMin, and ν ∈ I, σMin(`i, ν) must have a 0 delay, otherwise νk would not be in the same
interval as ν0. Thus, the play (`0, ν0)
c′0−→ · · · c
′
k−1−−−→ (`k, ν0) also conforms with σMin (with possibly different
costs). Furthermore, as all the delays are 0 we are sure that this play is also a valid play in GL′∪{`},r, in which
σMin is an NC-strategy. Therefore, pi(`0, `1) + · · ·+ pi(`k−1, `k) 6 −1, and σMin is an NC-strategy in GL′,r.
We now show the result for ` ∈ LMin. The proof for ` ∈ LMax is a straightforward adaptation. Notice that
every play in GL′,r that conforms with σMin is also a play in GL′∪{`},r that conforms with σMin, as σMin is defined
in GL′∪{`},r and thus plays with no delay in location `. Thus, for all ν ∈ [a, r] and `′ ∈ L, by the optimality
result of Lemma 3,
ValGL′,r (`
′, ν) 6 fakeσMinGL′,r (`
′, ν) = fakeσMinGL′∪{`},r (`
′, ν) = ValGL′∪{`},r (`
′, ν) . (6)
To obtain that ValGL′,r (`′, ν) = ValGL′∪{`},r (`′, ν), it remains to show the reverse inequality. To that extent,
let ρ be a finite play in GL′,r that conforms with σMax, starts in a configuration (`′, ν) with ν ∈ [a, r], and ends
in a final location. We show by induction on the length of ρ that Cost(ρ) > ValGL′∪{`},r (`′, ν). If ρ has size 1
then `′ is a final configuration and Cost(ρ) = ValGL′∪{`},r (`′, ν) = ϕ′`′(ν).
Otherwise ρ = (`′, ν) c−→ ρ′ where ρ′ is a run that conforms with σMax, starting in a configuration (`′′, ν′′)
and ending in a final configuration. By induction hypothesis, we have Cost(ρ′) > ValGL′∪{`},r (`′′, ν′′). We now
distinguish three cases, the two first being immediate:
If `′ ∈ LMax, then σMax(`′, ν) leads to the next configuration (`′′, ν′′), thus
ValGL′∪{`},r (`
′, ν) = ValσMaxGL′∪{`},r (`
′, ν) = c+ ValσMaxGL′∪{`},r (`
′′, ν′′) 6 c+ Cost(ρ′) = Cost(ρ) .
If `′ ∈ LMin, and `′ 6= ` or ν′′ = ν, we have that (`′, ν) c−→ (`′′, ν′′) is a valid transition in G′. Therefore,
ValGL′∪{`},r (`′, ν) 6 c+ ValGL′∪{`},r (`′′, ν′′), hence
Cost(ρ) = c+ Cost(ρ′) > c+ ValGL′∪{`},r (`
′′, ν′′) > ValGL′∪{`},r (`
′, ν).
Finally, if `′ = ` and ν′′ > ν, then c = (ν′′− ν)pi(`) +pi(`, `′′). As (`, ν′′) pi(`,`
′′)−−−−→ (`′′, ν′′) is a valid transition
in GL′∪{`},r, we have ValGL′∪{`},r (`, ν′′) 6 pi(`, `′′) + ValGL′∪{`},r (`′′, ν′′). Furthermore, since ν′′ ∈ [a, r], we
can use (1) to obtain
ValGL′∪{`},r (`, ν) 6 ValGL′∪{`},r (`, ν
′′) + (ν′′ − ν)pi(`) 6 ValGL′∪{`},r (`′′, ν′′) + pi(`, `′′) + (ν′′ − ν)pi(`) .
Therefore
Cost(ρ) = (ν′′ − ν)pi(`) + pi(`, `′′) + Cost(ρ′)
> (ν′′ − ν)pi(`) + pi(`, `′′) + ValGL′∪{`},r (`′′, ν′′) > ValGL′∪{`},r (`′, ν) .
This concludes the induction. As a consequence,
inf
σ′Min∈StratMin(GL′,r)
CostGL′,r (Play((`
′, ν), σ′Min, σMax)) > ValGL′∪{`},r (`
′, ν)
for all locations `′ and ν ∈ [a, r], which finally proves that ValGL′,r (`′, ν) > ValGL′∪{`},r (`′, ν). Fake-optimality
of σMin over [a, r] in GL′∪{`},r is then obtained by (6).
F.2 Proof that left(r) < r
This lemma allows us to effectively compute left(r):
I Lemma 20. Let G be an SPTG, L′ ⊆ L\Lu, and r ∈ (0, 1], such that GL′′,r is finitely optimal for all L′′ ⊆ L′.
Then, leftL′(r) is the minimal valuation such that for all locations ` ∈ L′ ∩ LMin (respectively, ` ∈ L′ ∩ LMax),
the slopes of the affine sections of the cost function ValGL′,r (`) on [left(r), r] are at least (respectively, at most)
−pi(`). Moreover, left(r) < r.
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Proof. Since ValGL′,r (`) = ValG(`) on [left(r), r], and as ` is non-urgent in G, Lemma 17 states that all the slopes
of ValG(`) are at least (respectively, at most) −pi(`) on [left(r), r].
We now show the minimality property by contradiction. Therefore, let r′ < left(r) such that all cost functions
ValGL′,r (`) are affine on [r′, left(r)], and assume that for all ` ∈ L′ ∩LMin (respectively, ` ∈ L′ ∩LMax), the slopes
of ValGL′,r (`) on [r′, left(r)] are at least (respectively, at most) −pi(`). Hence, this property holds on [r′, r]. Then,
by applying Proposition 5 |L′| times (here, we use the finite optimality of the games GL′′,r with L′′ ⊆ L′), one
can show that for all ν ∈ [r′, r] ValGr (`, ν) = ValGL′,r (`, ν). Using Lemma 18, we also know that for all ν 6 r,
and `, ValGr (`, ν) = ValG(`, ν). Thus, ValGr,L′ (`, ν) = ValG(`, ν). As r′ < left(r), this contradicts the definition
of leftL′(r).
We finally prove that left(r) < r. This is immediate in case left(r) = 0, since r > 0. Otherwise, from the
result obtained previously, we know that there exists r′ < left(r), and `? ∈ L′ such that ValGL′,r (`?) is affine on
[r′, left(r)] of slope smaller (respectively, greater) than −pi(`?) if `? ∈ LMin (respectively, `? ∈ LMax), i.e.,{
ValGL′,r (`?, r′) > ValGL′,r (`?, left(r)) + (left(r)− r′)pi(`?) if `? ∈ LMin
ValGL′,r (`?, r′) < ValGL′,r (`?, left(r)) + (left(r)− r′)pi(`?) if `? ∈ LMax .
From Lemma 19, we also know that{
ValGL′,r (`?, r′) 6 ValGL′,r (`?, r) + (r − r′)pi(`?) if `? ∈ LMin
ValGL′,r (`?, r′) > ValGL′,r (`?, r) + (r − r′)pi(`?) if `? ∈ LMax .
Both equations combined imply{
ValGL′,r (`?, r) > ValGL′,r (`?, left(r)) + (left(r)− r)pi(`?) if `? ∈ LMin
ValGL′,r (`?, r) < ValGL′,r (`?, left(r)) + (left(r)− r)pi(`?) if `? ∈ LMax
which is not possible if left(r) = r. J
F.3 Pieces of the value functions are segments of FG
I Lemma 21. Assume that G`?,r is finitely optimal. If ValG`?,r (`?) is affine on a non-singleton interval I ⊆ [0, r]
with a slope greater5 than −pi(`?), then there exists f ∈ FG such that for all ν ∈ I, ValG`?,r (`?, ν) = f(ν).
Proof. Let σMin and σMax be some fake-optimal NC-strategy and optimal FP-strategy in G`?,r. As I is a non-
singleton interval, there exists a subinterval I ′ ⊂ I, which is not a singleton and is contained in a interval of
σMin and of σMax.
Let ν ∈ I ′. As already noticed in the proof of Lemma 8, the play Play((`?, ν), σMin, σMax) necessarily reaches
a final location and has cost ValG`?,r (`?, ν). Let (`0, ν0)
c0−→ · · · (`k, νk) be its prefix until the first final location
`k (the prefix used to compute the cost of the play). We also let ν′ ∈ I ′ be a valuation such that ν < ν′.
Assume by contradiction that there exists an index i such that ν < νi and let i be the smallest of such
indices. For each j < i, if `j ∈ LMin, let (t, δ) = σMin(`j , ν) and (t′, δ′) = σMin(`j , ν′). Similarly, if `j ∈ LMax,
we let (t, δ) = σMax(`j , ν) and (t′, δ′) = σMax(`j , ν′). As I ′ is contained in an interval of σMin and σMax, we
have δ = δ′ and either t = t′ = 0, or ν + t = ν′ + t′. Applying this result for all j < i, we obtain that
(`0, ν′)
c′0−→ · · · (`i−1, ν′)
c′i−1−−−→ (`i, νi) ci−→ · · · (`k, νk) is a prefix of Play((`?, ν′), σMin, σMax): notice moreover that,
as before, this prefix has cost ValG`?,r (`?, ν′). In particular,
ValG`?,r (`?, ν′) = ValG`?,r (`?, ν)− (ν′ − ν)pi(`i−1) 6 ValG`?,r (`?, ν)− (ν′ − ν)pi(`?)
which implies that the slope of ValG`?,r (`?) is at most −pi(`?), and therefore contradicts the hypothesis. As a
consequence, we have that νi = ν for all i.
Again by contradiction, assume now that `k = `f for some ` ∈ L \ Lu. By the same reasoning as before, we
then would have ValG`?,r (`?, ν′) = ValG`?,r (`?, ν)− (ν′ − ν)pi(`), which again contradicts the hypothesis.
Therefore, `k ∈ Lf . If we let w = pi(`0, `1) + · · · + pi(`k−1, `k), we have ValG`?,r (`?, ν) = w + ϕ`k(ν). Since
σMin and σMax are FP-strategies, that play constantly in valuation ν, we know that (`0, ν)
c0−→ · · · (`k, ν) has no
5 For this result, the order does not depend on the owner of the location, but rather depends on the fact that `? has minimal
price amongst locations of G.
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ValG(`?, ν)
ν
−pi(`?)
fi
fj
rj ri
Figure 9 The case `? ∈ LMax: a geometric proof of fi 6= fj . The dotted lines represents fi and fj , the dashed lines
have slope −pi(`?), and the plain line depicts ValG(`?, ·). Because the slope of fi is strictly smaller than −pi(`?), and the
value at rj is above the dashed line it can not be the case that fi(rj) = ValG(`?, rj) = fj(rj).
cycle, therefore w ∈ [−(|L| − 1)Πtr, |L|Πtr] ∩ Z. Notice that the previous developments also show that for all
ν′ ∈ I ′ (here, ν < ν′ is not needed), ValG`?,r (`?, ν′) = w + ϕ`k(ν′), with the same location `k, and weight k.
Since this equality holds on I ′ ⊆ I which is not a singleton, and ValG`?,r (`?) is affine on I, it holds everywhere
on I. J
F.4 Proof of Lemma 6
For the first item, we assume `? ∈ LMin, since the proof of the other case only differ with respect to the sense
of the inequalities. From Lemma 20, we know that in G`?,ri there exists r′ < ri+1 such that ValG`?,ri (`?) is
affine of [r′, ri+1] and its slope is smaller that −pi(`?), i.e., ValG`?,ri (`?, ri+1) < ValG`?,ri (r′) − (ri+1 − r′)pi(`?).
Lemma 19 also ensures that ValG`?,ri (`
?, r′) 6 ValG(`?, ri) + (ri − r′)pi(`?). Combining both inequalities allows
us to conclude.
We now turn to the proof of the second item, showing the stationarity of sequence (ri). We consider first the
case where `? ∈ LMax. Let i > 0 such that ri 6= 0 (if there exist no such i then r1 = 0). Recall from Lemma 20
that there exists r′i < ri such that ValG`?,ri−1 (`
?) is affine on [r′i, ri], of slope greater than −pi(`?). In particular,
ValG`?,ri−1 (`
?, ri)− ValG`?,ri−1 (`?, r′i)
ri − r′i
> −pi(`?) .
Lemma 21 states that on [r′i, ri], ValG`?,ri−1 (`
?) is equal to some fi ∈ FG . As fi is an affine function, fi(ri) =
ValG`?,ri−1 (`
?, ri), and fi(r′i) = ValG`?,ri−1 (`
?, r′i), for all ν,
fi(ν) = ValG`?,ri−1 (`
?, ri) +
ValG`?,ri−1 (`
?, r′i)− ValG`?,ri−1 (`?, ri)
ri − r′i
(ri − ν).
Since G`?,ri−1 is assumed to be finitely optimal, we know that ValG`?,ri−1 (`?, ri) = ValG(`?, ri), by definition of
ri = left`?(ri−1). Therefore, for all valuation ν < ri, we have fi(ν) < ValG(`?, ri) + pi(`?)(ri − ν).
Consider then j > i such that rj 6= 0. We claim that fj 6= fi. Indeed, we have ValG(`?, rj) = fj(rj). As,
in G, `? is a non-urgent location, Lemma 17 ensures that (?): ValG(`?, rj) > ValG(`?, ri) + pi(`?)(ri − rj). As
for all i′, ValG(`?, ri′) = fi′(ri′), (?) is equivalent to fj(rj) > fi(ri) + pi(`?)(ri − rj). Recall that fi has a slope
strictly greater that −pi(`?), therefore fi(rj) < fi(ri) + pi(`?)(ri − rj) 6 fj(rj). As a consequence fi 6= fj (this
is depicted in Figure 9).
Therefore, there can not be more than |FG | + 1 non-null elements in the sequence r0 > r1 > · · · , which
proves that there exists i 6 |FG |+ 2 such that ri = 0.
We continue with the case where `? ∈ LMin. Let r∞ = inf{ri | i > 0}. In this case, we look at the affine parts
of ValG(`?) with a slope greater than −pi(`?), and we show that there can only be finitely many such segment
in [r∞, 1]. We then show that there is at least one such segment contained in [ri+1, ri] for all i, bounding the
size of the sequence.
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Figure 10 In order for the segments [a, b] and [c, d] to be aligned, there must exist a segment with a biggest slope
crossing f[a, b] (represented by a dashed line) between b and c.
In the following, we call segment every interval [a, b] ⊂ (r∞, 1] such that a and b, are two consecutive
cutpoints of the cost function ValG(`?) over (r∞, 1]. Recall that it means that ValG(`?) is affine on [a, b], and
if we let a′ be the greatest cutpoint smaller than a, and b′ the smallest cutpoint greater than b, the slopes of
ValG(`?) on [a′, a] and [b, b′] are different from the slope on [a, b]. We abuse the notations by referring to the
slope of a segment [a, b] for the slope of ValG(`?) on [a, b] and simply call cutpoint a cutpoint of ValG(`?).
To every segment [a, b] with a slope greater than −pi(`?), we associate a function f[a,b] ∈ FG as follows. Let i
be the smallest index such that [a, b]∩ [ri+1, ri] is a non singleton interval [a′, b′]. Lemma 21 ensures that there
exists f[a,b] ∈ FG such that for all ν ∈ [a′, b′], ValG(`?, ν) = f[a,b](ν).
Consider now two disjoint segments [a, b] and [c, d] with a slope strictly greater than −pi(`?), and assume that
f[a,b] = f[c,d] (in particular both segments have the same slope). Without loss of generality, assume that b < c.
We claim that there exists a segment [e, g] in-between [a, b] and [c, d] with a slope greater than the slope of [c, d],
and that f[e,g] and f[a,b] intersect over [b, c], in a point of abscisse x, i.e., x ∈ [b, c] verifies f[e,g](x) = f[a,b](x)
(depicted in Figure 10).
Let α be the greatest cutpoint smaller than c. We know that the slope of [α, c] is different from the one of [c, d].
If it is greater then define e = α and x = g = c, those indeed satisfy the property. If the slope of [α, c] is smaller
than the one of [c, d], then for all ν ∈ [α, c), ValG(`?, ν) > f[c,d](ν). Let x be the greatest point in [b, α] such that
ValG(`?, x) = f[c,d](x). We know that it exists since ValG(`?, b) = f[c,d](b), and ValG(`?) is continuous. Observe
that ValG(`?, ν) > f[c,d](ν), for all x < ν < c. Finally, let g be the smallest cutpoint of ValG(`?) strictly greater
than x, and e the greatest cutpoint of ValG(`?) smaller than or equal to x. By construction [e, g] is a segment
that contains x. The slope of the segment [e, g] is s[e,g] = ValG(`
?,g)−ValG(`?,x)
g−x , and the slope of the segment [c, d]
is equal to s[c,d] =
f[c,d](g)−f[c,d](x)
g−x . Remembering that ValG(`?, x) = f[c,d](x), and that ValG(`?, g) > f[c,d](g)
since g ∈ (x, c), we obtain that s[e,g] > s[c,d]. Finally, since ValG(`?, x) = f[c,d](x) = f[e,g](x), it is indeed the
abscisse of the intersection point of f[c,d] = f[a,b] and f[e,g], which concludes the proof of the previous claim.
For every function f ∈ FG , there are less than |FG | intersection points between f and the other functions of
FG (at most one for each pair (f, f ′)). If f has a slope greater than −pi(`?), thanks to the previous paragraph,
we know that there are at most |FG | segments [a, b] such that f[a,b] = f . Summing over all possible functions f ,
there are at most |FG |2 segments with a slope greater than −pi(`?).
Now, we link those segments with the valuations ri’s, for i > 0. By item (i), thanks to the finite-optimality
of G`?,ri , ValG(`?, ri+1) < (ri − ri+1)pi(`?) + ValG(`?, ri). Furthermore, Lemma 8 states that the slope of the
segment directly on the left of ri is equal to −pi(`?). With the previous inequality in mind, this can not be the
case if ValG(`?) is affine over the whole interval [ri+1, ri]. Thus, there exists a segment [a, b] of slope strictly
greater than −pi(`?) such that b ∈ [ri+1, ri]. As we also know that the slope left to ri+1 is −pi(`?), it must be
the case that a ∈ [ri+1, ri]. Hence, we have shown that in-between ri+1 and ri, there is always a segment (this
is depicted in Figure 11). As the number of such segments is bounded by |FG |2, we know that the sequence ri
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ValG(`?, ν)
ν
−pi(`?)
ri+1 ri
•
•
ValG(ri)+
pi(`?)(ri − ri+1)
Figure 11 The case `? ∈ LMin: as the value at ri+1 is strictly below ValG(ri) +pi(`?)(ri− ri+1), as the slope on the left
of ri and of ri+1 is −pi(`?), there must exist a segment (represented with a double line) with slope greater than −pi(`?)
in [ri+1, ri).
is stationary in at most |FG |2 + 1 steps, i.e., that there exists i 6 |FG |2 + 1 such that ri = 0.
F.5 Proof of Lemma 8
We denote by r′ the smallest valuation (smaller than r1) such that for all locations `, ValG(`) is affine over [r′, r1].
Then, the proof goes by contradiction: using Lemma 20, we assume that for all ` ∈ L′ ∩ LMin (respectively,
` ∈ L′ ∩ LMax):
either (¬(i)) the slope of ValG(`) on [r′, r1] is greater (respectively, smaller) than −pi(`),
or ((i) ∧ ¬(ii)) for all ν ∈ [r′, r1], ValG(`, ν) = ValG(`, r0) + pi(`)(r0 − ν).
Let σ0Min and σ0Max (respectively, σ1Min and σ1Max) be a fake-optimal NC-strategy and an optimal FP-strategy
in GL′,r0 (respectively, GL′,r1). Let r′′ = max(pts(σ1Min) ∪ pts(σ1Max)) ∩ [r′, r1), so that strategies σ1Min and σ1Max
have the same behaviour on all valuations of the interval (r′′, r1), i.e., either always play urgently the same
transition, or wait, in a non-urgent location, until reaching some valuation greater than or equal to r1 and then
play the same transition.
Observe preliminarily that for all ` ∈ L′ ∩ LMin (respectively, ` ∈ L′ ∩ LMax), if on the interval (r′′, r1), σ1Min
(respectively, σ1Max) goes to `f then the slope on [r′′, r1] (and thus on [r′, r1]) is −pi(`). Thus for such a location
`, we know that (i) ∧ ¬(ii) holds for ` (by letting r′ be r′′).
For other locations `, we will construct a new pair of NC- and FP-strategies σMin and σMax in GL′,r0 such
that for all locations ` and valuations ν ∈ (r′′, r1)
fakeσMinGL′,r0 (`, ν) 6 ValG(`, ν) 6 Val
σMax
GL′,r0
(`, ν) . (7)
As a consequence, with Lemma 3 (over game GL′,r0), one would have that ValGL′,r0 (`, ν) = ValG(`, ν), which
will raise a contradiction with the definition of r1 as leftL′(r0) < r0 (by Lemma 20), and conclude the proof.
We only show the construction for σMin, as it is very similar for σMax. Strategy σMin is obtained by combining
strategies σ1Min over [0, r1], and σ0Min over [r1, r0]: a special care has to be spent in case σ1Min performs a jump to
a location `f , since then, in σMin, we rather glue this move with the decision of strategy σ0Min in (`, r1). Formally,
let (`, ν) be a configuration of GL′,r0 with ` ∈ LMin. We construct σMin(`, ν) as follows:
if ν > r1, σMin(`, ν) = σ0Min(`, ν);
if ν < r1, ` 6∈ L′ and σ1Min(`, ν) =
(
t, (`, `f )
)
for some delay t (such that ν + t 6 r1), we let σMin(`, ν) =(
r1 − ν + t′, (`, `′)
)
where (t′, (`, `′)) = σ0Min(`, r1);
otherwise σMin(`, ν) = σ1Min(`, ν).
For all finite plays ρ in GL′,r0 that conform to σMin, start in a configuration (`, ν) such that ν ∈ (r′′, r0] and
` /∈ {`′f | `′ ∈ L}, and end in a final location, we show by induction that CostGL′,r0 (ρ) 6 ValG(`, ν). Note that
ρ either only contains valuations in [r1, r0], or is of the form (`, ν)
c−→ (`f , ν′), or is of the form (`, ν) c−→ ρ′ with
ρ′ a run that satisfies the above restriction.
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If ν ∈ [r1, r0], then ρ conforms with σ0Min, thus, as σ0Min is fake-optimal, CostGL′,r0 (ρ) 6 ValGL′,r0 (`, ν) =
ValG(`, ν) (the last inequality comes from the definition of r1 = leftL′(r0)). Therefore, in the following cases,
we assume that ν ∈ (r′′, r1).
Consider then the case where ρ is of the form (`, ν) c−→ (`f , ν′).
if ` ∈ L′∩LMin, ` is urgent in GL′,r0 , thus ν′ = ν. Furthermore, since ρ conforms with σMin, by construction
of σMin, the choice of σ1Min on (r′′, r1) consists in going to `f , thus, as observed above, (i)∧¬(ii) holds for
`. Therefore, ValG(`, ν) = ValG(`, r0) + pi(`)(r0 − ν) = ϕ`f (ν) = CostGL′,r0 (ρ).
If ` ∈ LMin \ L′, by construction, it must be the case that σMin(`, ν) =
(
r1 − ν + t′, (`, `f )
)
where(
t, (`, `f )
)
= σ1Min(`, ν) and
(
t′, (`, `f )
)
= σ0Min(`, r1). Thus, ν′ = r1 + t′. In particular, observe that
CostGL′,r0 (ρ) = (r1 − ν)pi(`) + CostGL′,r0 (ρ′) where ρ′ = (`, r1)
c′−→ (`f , ν′). As ρ′ conforms with σ0Min
which is fake-optimal in GL′,r0 , CostGL′,r0 (ρ′) 6 ValGL′,r0 (`, r1) = ValG(`, r1) (since r1 = left(r0)). Thus
CostGL′,r0 (ρ) 6 (r1 − ν)pi(`) + ValG(`, r1) = CostGL′,r1 (ρ′′) where ρ′′ = (`, ν)
c′′−→ (`f , ν + t) conforms
with σ1Min which is fake-optimal in GL′,r1 . Therefore, CostGL′,r0 (ρ) 6 ValGL′,r1 (`, ν) = ValG(`, ν) (since
r1 = left(r0)).
If ` ∈ LMax then CostGL′,r0 (ρ) = (ν′ − ν)pi(`) + ϕ`f (ν′) = (ν′ − ν)pi(`) + (r0 − ν′)pi(`) + ValG(`, r0) =
(r0 − ν)pi(`) + ValG(`, r0). By Lemma 17, since ` ∈ LMax \ Lu (` is not urgent in G since `f exists),
ValG(`, r1) > (r0 − r1)pi(`) + ValG(`, r0). Furthermore, observe that if we define ρ′ as the play (`, ν) c
′
−→
(`f , ν) in GL′,r1 , then ρ′ conforms with σ1Min and
CostGL′,r1 (ρ
′) = (r1 − ν)pi(`) + ValG(`, r1)
> (r1 − ν)pi(`) + (r0 − r1)pi(`) + ValG(`, r0)
= (r0 − ν)pi(`) + ValG(`, r0)
= CostGL′,r0 (ρ) .
Thus, as σ1Min is fake-optimal in GL′,r1 , CostGL′,r0 (ρ) 6 CostGL′,r1 (ρ′) 6 ValGL′,r1 (`, ν) = ValG(`, ν).
We finally consider the case where ρ = (`, ν) c−→ ρ′ with ρ′ that starts in configuration (`′, ν′) such that
`′ /∈ {`′′f | `′′ ∈ L}. By induction hypothesis CostGL′,r0 (ρ′) 6 ValG(`′, ν′).
If ν′ 6 r1, let ρ′′ be the play of GL′,r1 starting in (`′, ν′) that conforms with σ1Min and σ1Max. If ρ′′ does not
reach a final location, since σ1Min is an NC-strategy, the costs of its prefixes tend to −∞. By considering the
strategy σ′Min of Lemma 3, we would obtain a run conforming with σ1Max of cost smaller than ValGL′,r1 (`
′, ν′)
which would contradict the optimality of σ1Max. Hence, ρ′′ reaches the target. Moreover, since σ1Max is
optimal and σ1Min is fake-optimal, we finally know that CostGL′,r1 (ρ
′′) = ValGL′,r1 (`
′, ν′) = ValG(`′, ν′)
(since ν′ ∈ [left(r1), r1]). Therefore,
CostGL′,r0 (ρ) = (ν
′ − ν)pi(`) + pi(`, `′) + CostGL′,r0 (ρ
′)
6 (ν′ − ν)pi(`) + pi(`, `′) + ValG(`′, ν′)
= (ν′ − ν)pi(`) + pi(`, `′) + Cost(ρ′′) = Cost((`, ν) c
′
−→ ρ′′)
Since the play (`, ν) c
′
−→ ρ′′ conforms with σ1Min, we finally have CostGL′,r0 (ρ) 6 Cost((`, ν)
c′−→ ρ′′) 6
ValGL′,r1 (`, ν) = ValG(`, ν).
If ν′ > r1 and ` ∈ LMax, let ρ1 be the play in GL′,r1 defined by ρ1 = (`, ν) c
′
−→ (`f , ν) and ρ0 the play in
GL′,r0 defined by ρ0 = (`, r1) c
′′
−→ ρ′. We have
CostGL′,r0 (ρ) = (ν
′ − ν)pi(`) + pi(`, `′) + CostGL′,r0 (ρ
′)
= ϕ`f (ν)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=CostG
L′,r1
(ρ1)
−ValG(`, r1) + (ν′ − r1)pi(`) + pi(`, `′) + CostGL′,r0 (ρ
′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=CostG
L′,r0
(ρ0)
.
Since ρ0 conforms with σ0Min, fake-optimal, and reaches a final location, CostGL′,r0 (ρ
0) 6 ValGL′,r0 (`, r1) =
ValG(`, r1) (since r1 = leftL′(r0)). We also have that ρ1 conforms with σ1Min, so the previous explanations
already proved that CostGL′,r1 (ρ
1) 6 ValG(`, ν). As a consequence CostGL′,r0 (ρ) 6 ValG(`, ν).
28 Simple Priced Timed Games Are Not That Simple
x
0
1
4
1
2
3
4
1
Val(`2, x)
−9.5
−6 −5.5
−2
1
x
0
1
4
1
2
3
4
9
10 1
Val(`1, x)
−9.5
−6 −5.5
−2−0.2
x
0
1
4
1
2 1
Val(`3, x)
−10
−6 −5.5−7
x
0 1
Val(`4, x)
−4
−7
x
0
3
4 1
Val(`5, x)
−14
−2
1
x
0 1
Val(`6, x)
−11
1
x
0 1
Val(`7, x)
−16
0
Figure 12 Value functions of the SPTG of Figure 1
If ν′ > r1 and ` ∈ LMin, we know that ` is non-urgent, so that ` 6∈ L′. Therefore, by definition of σMin,
σMin(`, ν) = (r1−ν+ t′, (`, `′)) where σ1Min(`, ν) = (t, (`, `f )) for some delay t, and σ0Min(`, r1) = (t′, (`, `′)).
If we let ρ1 be the play in GL′,r1 defined by ρ1 = (`, ν) c
′
−→ (`f , ν) and ρ0 the play in GL′,r0 defined by
ρ0 = (`, r1)
c′′−→ ρ′, as in the previous case, we obtain that CostGL′,r0 (ρ) 6 ValG(`, ν).
As a consequence of this induction, we have shown that for all ` ∈ L, and for all ν ∈ (r′′, r1), fakeσMinGL′,r0 (`, ν) 6
ValG(`, ν), which shows one inequality of (7), the other being obtained very similarly.
G Run of the algorithm on an example
Figure 12 shows the value functions of the SPTG of Figure 1. Here is how the algorithm obtains those functions.
First it computes the functions at valuation 1, thanks to solveInstant. Then, it computes the value of the
game where all states are urgent but additional terminal states have been added by the wait function to allow
waiting until 1. This step gives the correct value functions until the cutpoint 34 : in the repeat loop, at first
a = 9/10 but the slope in `1 is smaller than the slope that would be granted by waiting. Then a = 3/4 where
the algorithm gives a slope of value −16 in `2 while the cost of this Max’s location is −14. We thus choose
r := 3/4 and compute the algorithm on the interval [0, r] with final states allowing one to wait until r and get
the already known value in r. The algorithm then stops at 12 in order to allow `1 to wait, then in
1
4 because of
`2 and finally the algorithm reaches 0 giving us the value functions on the entire interval [0, 1].
H Reset-acyclic PTGs
Towards solving reset-acyclic PTGs, our first step is to remove strict guards from the transitions, i.e., guards
of the form (a, b], [b, a) or (a, b) with a, b ∈ N. For this, we enhance the PTG with regions in a method similar
to what is done in [15, Lemma 4.6]. Formally, let G = (LMin, LMax, Lf , Lu,ϕ,∆, pi) be a PTG. We define the
region-PTG of G as G′ = (L′Min, L′Max, L′f , L′u,ϕ′,∆′, pi′) where:
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L′Min = {(`, I) | ` ∈ LMin, I ∈ RegG};
L′Max = {(`, I) | ` ∈ LMax, I ∈ RegG};
Lf = {(`, I) | ` ∈ Lf , I ∈ RegG};
Lu = {(`, I) | ` ∈ Lu, I ∈ RegG};
∀(`, I) ∈ L′f , ϕ′`,I = ϕ`;
∆′ =
{
((`, I), Ig ∩ I,R, (`′, I ′)) | (`, Ig, R, `′) ∈ ∆, I ′ =
{
I if R = ⊥
{0} otherwise
}
∪ {((`, (Mk,Mk+1)), {Mk+1},⊥, (`, {Mk+1})) | ` ∈ L, (Mk,Mk+1) ∈ RegG}
∪ {((`, {Mk}), {Mk},⊥, (`, (Mk,Mk+1))) | ` ∈ L, (Mk,Mk+1) ∈ RegG} ;
∀(`, I) ∈ L′, pi′(`, I) = pi(`); and ∀((`, I), Ig, R, (`′, I ′)) ∈ ∆′, if (`, Ig, R, `′) ∈ ∆, then pi((`, I), Ig, R, (`′, I ′)) =
pi(`, Ig, R, `), else pi((`, I), Ig, R, (`′, I ′)) = 0.
It is easy to verify that, in all configurations ((`, {Mk}), ν) reachable from the null valuation, the valuation
ν is Mk. More interestingly, in all configurations ((`, (Mk,Mk+1)), ν) reachable from the null valuation, the
valuation ν is in [Mk,Mk+1]: indeed if ν = Mk (respectively, Mk+1), it intuitively simulates a configuration
of the original game with a valuation arbitrarily close to Mk, but greater than Mk (respectively, smaller than
Mk+1). The game can thus take transitions with guard x > Mk, but can not take transitions with guard x = Mk
anymore.
I Lemma 22. Let G be a one-clock PTG, and G′ be its region-PTG defined as before. For (`, I) ∈ L×RegG and
ν ∈ I, ValG(`, ν) = ValG′((`, I), ν). Moreover, we can transform an ε-optimal strategy of G′ into a ε′-optimal
strategy of G with ε′ > ε.
Proof. The proof consists in replacing strategies of G′ where players can play on the borders of regions, by
strategies of G that play increasingly close to the border as time passes. If played close enough, the loss created
can be chosen as small as we want. J
Consider now the region-PTG G associated to a reset-acyclic PTG (and of polynomial size with respect to the
original PTG). We can decompose the graph of G into strongly connected components (that do not contain reset
transitions by hypothesis). Consider first its bottom strongly connected components, i.e., components with no
reset transitions exiting from them. All clock constraints are of the form [a, b] with a < b, or {a}. We denote
by 0 = M0 < M1 < · · · < MK the constants appearing in the guards of the component (adding 0). Then,
solving the component amounts to (i) solve the sub-game with only transitions with guard {Mk}, replacing
then these transitions by final locations with the cost just computed, (ii) solve the modified sub-game with only
transitions with guard [Mk−1,Mk], by first shrinking the guards to transform the game into an SPTG, and so
on, until M0 = 0. Once all bottom strongly connected components are solved, we replace the reset transitions
going to them by final locations again, using the cost computed so far. We continue until no strongly connected
components remain. Each SPTG being solvable in exponential time, the overall reset-acyclic can be solved in
exponential time too.
